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AVOIDING JEOPARDY, WITHOUT
THE QUESTIONS: RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMS
FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES IN
WESTERN RIVER BASINS
Reed D. Benson*
The application of the Endangered Species Act to water resources has generated
much controversy in the American West. In several western river basins,
however, Recovery Implementation Programs (RIPs) provide an alternative,
collaborative approach to ESA compliance. These programs offer an enhanced
role for states and stakeholders in ESA decisionmaking, and increased certainty
that ESA requirements will not disrupt ongoing water project operations and
established uses. This Article examines the origins, purposes, and elements of various
RIPs, with particular emphasis on these programs’ approach to compliance with
the requirements of ESA section 7 for federal agency actions. The Article also
considers the legal and political successes achieved by RIPs, and concludes by
posing and analyzing certain questions regarding the popularity and future of
these programs.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill in
1978,1 it not only blocked completion of a nearly finished federal dam to
save the endangered snail darter; it also elevated the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)2 into one of the nation’s most powerful environmental laws,
intended to “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost.”3 Congress responded by ordering the completion of the dam, but
largely preserved the relevant provision of the ESA.4 Congress later adopted
a set of ESA amendments that included the following statement: “It is
further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall

1.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
2.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
3.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
4.
See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck
eds., 2005).
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cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in
concert with conservation of endangered species.”5
Despite this policy of cooperation, the record of water resource issues
involving endangered species is filled with conflict, including some of the
greatest controversies in the history of the ESA. For the most part, these
controversies have involved federal water projects in the western United
States, built and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The
Klamath Basin water crisis, where many farmers on one of the oldest reclamation projects lost nearly their entire water supply in the drought year of
2001, was perhaps the most intense dispute.6 Two years later, a court of
appeals holding that farmers and cities on the Rio Grande could lose “their”
federal project water to an endangered minnow7 sparked outrage in New
Mexico; Albuquerque’s mayor blasted both “the fringe environmental community, which . . . wants to take water from the mouths of our children” and
“federal judges who are accountable to nobody in our society, who are not
elected, who hide behind their nice robes and tall desks, [who] want to put
the future of this community in jeopardy.”8 The nation’s hottest endangered
species conflict today involves the Federal Central Valley Project in California, pitting the needs of endangered salmon and Delta smelt against
irrigation and other traditional water uses. ESA requirements in the Central
Valley have been heavily litigated for two decades,9 and the cases show no
sign of stopping10—nor does the political controversy over limits on water
deliveries.11
5.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2006). There was a push in 1982 to weaken the ESA, and
some members of Congress sought to insert a strong statement of deference to state water
law into the Act, like the “Wallop Amendment” codified as § 101(g) of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2006). That effort failed, however, leading to the policy statement
regarding federal-state cooperation. A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western
Water Rights, 20 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 1, 19 (1985).
6.
See HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 1–4 (2008).
7.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as
moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
8.
See Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much In Common: Considering the
Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.
29, 63 (2004) (quoting Mayor Martin Chavez); see also Lara Katz, History of the Minnow
Litigation and Its Implications for the Future of Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande, 47 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 675, 682 (2007) (stating that the court’s ruling “was effectively a declaration of
war for water users, the State, and politicians . . . .”).
9.
See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1993) (application of ESA to water contract renewals); O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.
1995) (USBR authority to reduce water deliveries to comply with ESA); Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (ESA restrictions on water
deliveries as taking of property).
10.
See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2012)
(addressing the applicability of the ESA to certain water supply contracts); Consol. Salmonid
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Other parts of the West, however, have indeed seen cooperation among
federal, state, and local entities over ESA issues involving water resources.
In the Upper Colorado River Basin, the federal government has worked
cooperatively with three states, water users, and conservation groups for
twenty-five years under a program that seeks to protect both water users
and endangered species.12 The San Juan River Basin has had a very similar
program since 1992,13 and in the Platte River Basin, a cooperative program
was initiated in 199714 and finalized in 2006.15 In each of these basins, ESA
compliance for USBR project operations and other activities has been
governed by a Recovery Implementation Plan (RIP). These programs seek
to allow continued water use and development while also implementing
certain measures to benefit endangered fish and bird species that live in and
along the Upper Colorado, San Juan, and Platte Rivers. Every one of these
established programs has provided years of ESA compliance for waterrelated activities, with little controversy and no litigation—and a brand new
RIP seeks to do the same in New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande Basin.16
RIPs are not off-the-shelf ESA products; unlike critical habitat designations or biological opinions, they do not specifically appear in the statute

Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. Supp. 2d
1021 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (both addressing validity of ESA biological opinions regarding
Central Valley Project operations).
11.
For example, the Water and Power Subcommittee of the U.S. House Natural
Resources Committee calls the Central Valley situation a “man-made drought,” and blames
court decisions requiring allocation of water to endangered fish. Because of this situation,
the Subcommittee’s website says, “the San Joaquin Valley is in danger of becoming a dust
bowl unless immediate action is taken to change policies that put the needs of fish above the
livelihood of people.” The Man-Made California Drought, NATURAL RES. COMM.,
http://www.naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5921 (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
12.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO
RIVER BASIN (1987) [hereinafter Upper Colorado RIP Program Document].
13.
SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, FINAL
PROGRAM DOCUMENT (2010), available at www.fws.gov/southwest/sjrip/pdf/DOC_Final_
Program_Document_appendices_2010.pdf [hereinafter San Juan RIP Program Document].
14.
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER
EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE
RIVER, NEBRASKA (1997), available at https://platteriverprogram.org/PubsAndData/
ProgramLibrary/Cooperative%20Agreement%20for%20Central%20Platte%20River.pdf.
15.
PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT
(2006),
available
at
https://www.platteriverprogram.org/pubsanddata/programlibrary/
cooperative%20agreement%20for%20central%20platte%20river.pdf.
16.
MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM,
DRAFT MIDDLE RIO GRANDE COLLABORATIVE RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM
(RIP) DOCUMENT, 3 (July 2012 Draft) [hereinafter Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program
Document] (on file with author).
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or even the implementing rules.17 Thus, RIPs have no official definition,
but have been described as “voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiatives developed by the [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] that seek to balance water use
and development with the recovery of federally-listed species.”18 This description is generally accurate, but no two RIPs are quite alike in their
composition, objectives, and operations. For example, unlike the four RIPs
identified in the previous paragraph, at least two others—the Recovery
Implementation Committee in the Missouri River Basin19 and the Edwards
Aquifer RIP in Texas20—are not relied upon to ensure ongoing ESA
compliance in the operation of federal water projects,21 and therefore these
relatively new programs22 are not considered in this article. Another general
observation about RIPs is that they are found only in western waters,
primarily river systems with major federal water projects. In other words,
all of the existing RIPs relate to the management and use of water resources
in the western United States.23

17.
See infra notes 70–73 (critical habitat designations), 95-101 (biological opinions),
and accompanying text. The ESA does provide for recovery plans (see infra notes 73–86 and
accompanying text), but nothing in statute or rule suggests that these plans would lead to
official programs involving multiple sovereigns, formal governance structures, and multimillion dollar budgets, as the RIPs have become. See infra Part III.A (describing various
aspects of RIPs).
18.
ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM
(EARIP) 2 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistory
March2010.pdf.
19.
MISSOURI RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., MISSOURI RIVER
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE FACT SHEET (2011), available at
http://www.moriverrecovery.org/mrrp/f?p=136:32:0::NO:::: (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
20.
ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM
(EARIP) SUMMARY (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistory
March2010.pdf.
21.
The Edwards Aquifer RIP produced a Habitat Conservation Plan to ensure take
coverage for non-federal actions under ESA section 10, rather than providing compliance for
federal agency actions under section 7. Id. This effort was rewarded when the FWS recently
approved a section 10 permit based on the plan developed by the RIP. Edwards Aquifer
Recovery Implementation Program Habitat Conservation Plan, 78 Fed. Reg. 11218 (Feb. 15,
2013). The Missouri River Recovery Implementation Committee is heavily involved in
developing and implementing an adaptive management program regarding Missouri River
operations and habitat, and although it grew out of a 2003 consultation on Missouri River
operations, it is not designed to ensure section 7 compliance for ongoing or new activities in
the basin. Telephone Interview with Michael Thabault, Ass’t Regional Director for Ecological
Services, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, in Denver, Colo. (Sept. 5, 2012). Mr. Thabault has
primary oversight of all major water-related recovery programs covered by the Service’s
Denver regional office, including those on the Missouri, Platte, and Upper Colorado.
22.
Both the Missouri River and Edwards Aquifer RIPs were established in the mid2000s. See infra notes 208–209 and accompanying text.
23.
Telephone Interview with Michael Thabault, supra note 21.
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This Article addresses Recovery Implementation Programs for endangered species in the context of four western river basins where the USBR is
a key water supplier and manager. Rather than focus in detail on any
particular program, this Article addresses these RIPs as a group, representing
a unique approach to ESA compliance that has taken root in the western
water context. Part I of this Article provides context, outlining federal and
state roles regarding water resources in the West. Part II explains the
requirements of the ESA, focusing on federal agency obligations under
section 7 and summarizing three situations where these requirements have
applied to USBR project operations. Part III explains the structure,
purposes, and elements of four RIPs; examines some key differences
between these programs and the usual ESA approach in the water context;
and notes the success of these programs in legal terms. Part IV attempts to
answer three broad questions about RIPs: why they have caught on in the
western water context, whether they can actually recover species, and
whether they are likely to become even more popular.

I. FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES REGARDING WATER
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST
A. Federalism in Water Law
Water law in the western United States is primarily state law, and the
western states have generally allocated water under the doctrine of prior
appropriation.24 This system recognizes water rights based on application of
water to a “beneficial use,” and such rights last forever so long as they
continue to be exercised;25 in times of shortage, the oldest water rights take
priority over those established later.26 By providing secure entitlements to

24.
As the Western Governors Association recently stated, “States have the pivotal
role in allocating, administering, protecting, and developing water resources . . . .”
W. GOVERNORS ASS’N, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 1 (2011), available
at http://www.westgov.org/policies/doc_download/1441-11-7.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
The western states have striven to maintain primacy since the 1800s. See generally California
v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653–70 (1978) (describing history of federal-state relations in
western water law through the 1902 Reclamation Act, emphasizing the views of western
states and congressmen regarding state control of water resources). The Western Governors
Association remains fully committed to protecting state authority over water.
25.
See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920 (1998).
26.
See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 881, 881 (2000) (calling the principle of senior uses taking priority over junior uses
“the central dogma of western water law”).
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water use, western water law has sought to promote water development for
productive uses such as irrigation, industry, and municipal water supply.27
In managing water, however, the western states have been forced to
share power with the federal government. Although the Supreme Court has
stated that the history of western water law reveals a “consistent thread of
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress,”28 that
remark is at best misleading about the significance of federal law in this
context.29 In reality, federal law has limited state water allocation authority
since at least 1899, when the Supreme Court upheld the power of the
national government to block a new dam on the Rio Grande that had
already been approved by New Mexico.30 While acknowledging that
Congress had largely left water allocation in state hands, the Court affirmed
federal power to protect navigation, and also declared that “a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so far, at least
as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property.”31
This latter statement foreshadowed the Court’s 1908 decision in Winters
v. United States,32 holding that an Indian reservation in Montana had a water
right based on federal law; the treaty establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation said nothing about water, but the Court determined that an
irrigation water right was necessary to fulfill the purposes of that treaty.33
Winters established that the federal government could claim water rights for
Indian reservations for the amount of water needed to serve the purpose(s)
for which they were created.34 For decades it was thought that the Winters

27.
See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935)
(explaining the western states’ choice of prior appropriation to provide water for manufacturing, irrigation, and mining purposes), 157–58 (declaring that the choice of prior
appropriation allowed the West to develop, and “became the determining factor in the long
struggle to expunge from our vocabulary the legend ‘Great American Desert,’ which was
spread in large letters across the face of the old maps of the far west”).
28.
California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 653.
29.
See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal
Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6 (2001) (calling
federal deference to state water law a “myth”); Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth:
National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 241, 249 (“Congress and the Supreme Court have generally refused to cede control
over water to the states if there was a potential conflict with an important national interest
such as navigation, hydropower development, federal reclamation policy, or more recently,
environmental protection.”).
30.
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
31.
Id. at 703.
32.
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
33.
Id. at 576.
34.
See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–600 (1963).
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doctrine was limited to Indian country,35 but the Supreme Court signaled in
1955 that it might extend to other federal lands designated for a particular
purpose.36 The prospect of “federal reserved water rights” for tribal and
federal lands raised serious concerns in the western states,37 both before and
after the Supreme Court confirmed that the United States could claim
them for national lands such as parks, forests, and wildlife refuges.38 Not
only did federal water rights jeopardize state control over water allocation,
they also threatened to disrupt existing water uses, because many Indian
reservations and federal land designations predated water rights (for irrigation and other uses) established under state law.39
Even though the Winters doctrine provides a clear legal basis for federal
water rights for federal and tribal lands, the western states have largely been
able to minimize the practical impact of reserved right claims. A key reason
for the states’ success is a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting a
federal statute known as the McCarran Amendment,40 and holding, in
effect, that the purposes of this law are ordinarily best served by having
federal and tribal water right claims heard in state courts.41 Since these
cases, federal and tribal water claims have been heard almost exclusively in

35.
See Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENV. U. L.
REV. 473, 475 (1977) (stating that the author never heard it suggested before 1955 that the
reserved rights doctrine applied to non-Indian lands).
36.
Federal Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 446–47 (1955).
37.
See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976) (noting that bills had been
introduced in Congress to require at least some federal water uses to obtain water rights
exclusively under state law, but none had passed). Such bills are discussed extensively in Eva
H. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters—A Decade of Attempted “Clarifying
Legislation,” 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 446–512 (1966).
38.
Id. at 601.
39.
See John E. Thorson, Ramsey L. Kropf, Andrea K. Gerlak and Dar Crammond,
Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 299, 306–12 (explaining concerns of western states and water users with
potential implications of federal and tribal reserved rights).
40.
This 1952 appropriations rider, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006), waived federal
sovereign immunity for the United States to be joined in general stream adjudications in
state courts. These cases typically involve large numbers of water right claims in a particular
stream system, and the McCarran Amendment was intended to allow federal claims to be
heard in the same proceedings as private claims under state law. See Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810–11 (1976) (discussing legislative
history). The statute did not clearly address reserved right claims, however, and made no
mention of U.S. claims on behalf of tribes.
41.
For a fuller discussion of these cases, see Benson, supra note 2929, at 268–72;
Thorson, supra note 39, at 334–37 (both summarizing and interpreting United States v.
District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545 (1983)).
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state courts,42 which are widely seen as less advantageous for such claims.43
In reality, however, tribal reserved right claims have usually been resolved
through settlement rather than litigation,44 typically following years of
negotiations involving federal, tribal, and state representatives and sometimes other stakeholders too;45 these settlements have typically made
significant sums of (mostly federal) money available to the tribes for water
and economic development, and have also protected non-Indian water users
from harm they may otherwise have faced from recognition of senior tribal
rights.46 “Subordination” of senior tribal claims to existing (and sometimes
even future) non-Indian uses can be a bitter pill for tribes to swallow,47 but
it satisfies a top priority of states: ensuring certainty for their water users.48
Even when they have turned to the national government for assistance—in the form of federal water projects to supply water for irrigation
and other purposes—the western states have sought to retain maximum
authority over their water resources. Thus, when Congress enacted the 1902
42.
See Thorson et al., supra note 39, at 337 (stating that after these Supreme Court
cases, western states launched water right adjudications “with the grim conviction that
federal reserved [water] rights did in fact exist, a concern somewhat softened by the fact that
most of these rights would be determined in a forum perceived to be more favorable: state
court”). Only two states, Nevada and New Mexico, have significant water adjudications in
federal court. Id. at 351, 361.
43.
Id. at 337, 333 (noting that states feared adjudication of federal and tribal claims in
federal courts, while federal and tribal attorneys feared state court adjudication); Michael C.
Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine? Denying Reserved Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and
Its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 178 (2002) (asserting, in an article focusing on nontribal reserved right claims, that state courts “have proved largely hostile to reserved
rights”); Michael C. Blumm, David H. Becker, and Joshua Smith, The Mirage of Indian
Reserved Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1201 (2006) (“The six cases examined in this study reveal that
. . . misgivings about states’ ability to provide a neutral forum for adjudicating tribal
reserved water rights were well justified.”).
44.
Jeanne S. Whiting, Indian Water Rights: The Era of Settlement, in THE FUTURE OF
INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL 136–37
(Barbara Cosens & Judith V. Royster eds., 2012) (noting more than twenty tribal water right
settlements between 1978 and 2008, but only two sets of tribal reserved rights determined
through litigation in that time).
45.
Id. at 139 (describing parties to reserved right settlement negotiations, and
explaining federal participation).
46.
Id. at 138 (describing benefits of settlement, including various ways to determine
tribal rights “while also ameliorating impacts to existing water users”).
47.
See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 927 (6th ed. 2009).
48.
Id. at 924 (“Non-Indian water users and state water administrators generally seek
certainty of rights and maximum protection of existing uses, particularly by appropriators
junior to the tribe whose interests are exposed in litigation.”). Federal officials, too, may
want to see existing users protected. Id. (“The federal government seeks to mollify political
constituencies allied with non-Indians and state authorities, but within the constraints of its
trust responsibility to the tribes.”).
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Reclamation Act49 authorizing the U.S. Department of the Interior (Interior)
to construct irrigation projects in the West, it included a provision recognizing state water laws and water rights, and requiring the federal government
“to proceed in conformity with such laws” in carrying out the program.50
Thus, the states largely retained their role controlling water allocation and
use, even as water development in the West increasingly was driven by
Congress and the USBR.

B. Federal Reclamation Projects and Their Operations
The Reclamation Act authorized the Interior Secretary to build “irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters”51 in the
western states and territories. As originally conceived, these projects would
supply irrigation water to farmers who would settle on designated lands and
“reclaim” them for irrigated agriculture, repaying the government’s
construction costs over a ten-year period.52 The USBR’s influence grew,
however, as the reclamation program expanded to serve new purposes. By
1939, Congress had recognized that reclamation projects could serve multiple purposes, including hydropower, flood control, navigation, municipal
water supply, and other “miscellaneous purposes.”53 Historian Donald
Pisani wrote that the “High Dam Era” of the 1930s, with its large multipurpose projects, made the USBR “the most important federal agency in
the West. From 1930 to 1970 the water and power provided by the bureau
transformed the region . . . .”54 Today, reclamation projects deliver irrigation water to 10 million acres and one-fifth of the West’s farmers, generate
enough hydropower to serve 3.5 million homes, provide municipal water
49.
Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered sections of
43 U.S.C. from §§ 371–498).
50.
This requirement is found in section 8 of the 1902 Act, (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372, 383 (2006)). Western states and water users had pushed for even greater state
control of the federal reclamation program. See DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED
WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902 at 298–319 (1992) (explaining efforts
of western members of Congress to enact a federal irrigation program that would be
controlled by the states rather than the national government).
51.
Act of June 17, 1902 § 2 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 411 (2006)).
52.
Id. §§ 4–5.
53.
Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1187, 1193 (1939)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 485h(a) (2006)). Well before 1939, however, Congress was already
authorizing reclamation projects for multiple purposes; for example, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act authorized construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam for purposes of river regulation,
improvement of navigation, flood control, “irrigation and domestic uses, and satisfaction of
present perfected rights,” and also provided for hydropower development at the dam. Act of
December 21, 1928, ch. 42, § 6, 45 Stat. 1057, 1061.
54.
Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation Law in the Twentieth Century: A Centennial
Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY ESSAYS FROM THE CENTENNIAL
SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND II 611, 611 (2008).
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supplies serving 31 million people, and provide 90 million visitor-days of
recreation.55
From the beginning, the USBR was to manage and operate project
reservoirs,56 and today it operates nearly 350 of them57 in seventeen western
states.58 The operation of a particular project is governed largely by the
statute(s) authorizing that project, and by the contracts under which the
project supplies water for certain uses.59 Authorizing statutes specify
(among other things) the purposes for which the project is to be constructed
and operated, such as irrigation, hydropower, and recreation.60 The specific
water supply obligations of a project are governed by contracts between the
USBR and an entity such as an irrigation district or a municipality,61 which
in turn delivers the water to end users such as irrigators or homeowners.
Operation of these reservoirs, however, creates a variety of serious and
ongoing environmental impacts throughout the West. Most notably, reservoir operations change the quantity, quality, and timing of downstream river
flows, often damaging aquatic ecosystems and harming native species.62
55.
Bureau of Reclamation-About Us, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
56.
Act of June 17, 1902 § 6 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 498 (2006)).
57.
Bureau of Reclamation Facts & Information, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
58.
The seventeen Reclamation states are the six Great Plains states from North
Dakota down to Texas, the three West Coast states, and the eight states of the Interior West.
43 U.S.C. § 391 (2006).
59.
For a general overview of these arrangements governing reclamation project
water, see Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363 (1997).
60.
For example, Congress authorized the multipurpose Washita Basin Project in
Oklahoma
for the principal purposes of storing, regulating, and furnishing water for municipal,
domestic, and industrial use, and, for the irrigation of approximately twenty-six
thousand acres of land and of controlling floods and, as incidents to the foregoing
for the additional purposes of regulating the flow of the Washita River, providing
for the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife, and of enhancing
recreational opportunities.
Act of February 25, 1956, ch. 71, § 1, 70 Stat. 28.
61.
See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 41.05(c) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley
eds., 3rd ed. 2009) (discussing the Bureau’s water delivery obligations under its water supply
contracts).
62.
Richter and Thomas summarize the typical downstream effects of dams (not
necessary Bureau dams) as follows:
Of all the environmental changes wrought by dam construction and operation, the
alteration of natural water flow regimes has had the most pervasive and damaging
effects on river ecosystems and species (Poff et al. 1997, Postel and Richter 2003).
Below we discuss the ways that dam operations induce hydrologic changes, the
nature of which is strongly influenced by the operating purposes of the dam.
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Indeed, a 1996 study of counties in the western United States “found that
the number of ESA-listed fish species in a county correlated positively with
the level of irrigated agriculture reliant on surface water in the county. In
particular, the number of species depended positively on water-supply
levels of the Bureau of Reclamation.”63 In other words, the more water
delivered by USBR projects in a particular area, the more threatened or
endangered fish species in that area. This correlation between reclamation
projects and listed species has made the ESA an increasingly major factor in
USBR’s operations, as discussed in the next section.

II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND ITS APPLICATION TO
FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS
Enacted in 1973, the ESA is one of the nation’s most important and
controversial environmental laws. The ESA’s purpose is to conserve endangered and threatened species64 and the ecosystems on which they depend.65
As the Supreme Court stated, “[E]xamination of the language, history, and
structure of the legislation . . . indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”66 All
federal agencies have ESA duties, but the two most responsible for deterDams can heavily modify the volume of water flowing downstream, change the
timing, frequency, and duration of high and low flows, and alter the natural rates
at which rivers rise and fall during runoff events. Although much has been written
about the ecological consequences of hydrologic alteration, Bunn and Arthington
(2002) summarize their review of this literature by highlighting four primary ecological impacts associated with flow alteration: (1) because river flow shapes
physical habitats such as riffles, pools, and bars in rivers and floodplains, and
thereby determines biotic composition, flow alteration can lead to severely modified channel and floodplain habitats; (2) aquatic species have evolved life history
strategies, such as their timing of reproduction, in direct response to natural flow
regimes, which can be de-synchronized through flow alteration; (3) many species
are highly dependent upon lateral and longitudinal hydraulic connectivity, which
can be broken through flow alteration; and (4) the invasion of exotic and introduced species in river systems can be facilitated by flow alteration.
Brian D. Richter & Gregory A. Thomas, Restoring Environmental Flows by Modifying Dam
Operations, 12(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 12 (2007), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol12/iss1/art12 (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
63.
Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish
Versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 348 (1996).
64.
16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006). The ESA defines an endangered species as one that is
“in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” id. § 1532(6),
while a threatened species is one that is “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future.” Id. § 1532(20). Through rules issued under section 4(d) of the ESA, id.
§ 1533(d), the law typically applies equally to both types of species.
65.
Id. § 1531(b).
66.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
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mining the status and needs of imperiled species are the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) within the Interior, and for oceangoing species
such as salmon, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the
Department of Commerce (together, “the Services”).

A. Key Provisions of the ESA
1. Section 4: Species Listing and Recovery Planning
Section 4 of the ESA largely deals with decisions regarding the listing
of species as threatened or endangered.67 The statute requires the FWS or
NMFS to make such decisions through notice-and-comment rulemaking,68
“solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.”69
Section 4 also calls on the relevant Service to designate critical habitat70 for
each species at the time of listing,71 using the same process and the same
information as in listing decisions, but also “taking into consideration the
economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”72 Thus,
section 4 requires the relevant Service to determine which species, and
which habitat for these species, require protection.
In addition, ESA section 4(f) requires the relevant Service “to develop
and implement plans . . . for the conservation and survival” of listed
species.73 Such recovery plans must contain site-specific management
actions for the conservation and survival of the species, specific criteria for
de-listing the species, and estimates of the time and money required to
carry out the identified measures.74 No rulemaking process is required,
although the relevant Service must provide for public notice and comment
before adopting a recovery plan, and must consider all information provided
during the comment period.75
Although the statute mandates that the relevant Service “develop and
implement” recovery plans,76 the plans themselves have limited legal signif67.
16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
68.
Id. § 1533(a)(1), 1533(b)(4).
69.
Id. § 1533(b)(1).
70.
The statute defines critical habitat in some detail, but the key requirement is that
the habitat be “essential for the conservation of the species.” Id. § 1532(5).
71.
The requirement for critical habitat designation at the time of listing is not
absolute. See id. 1533(b)(6)(C).
72.
Id. § 1533(b)(2).
73.
Id. § 1533(f)(1). This requirement applies unless the Service determines that a
plan would not promote the conservation of the species. Id.
74.
Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B).
75.
Id. § 1533(f)(4).
76.
Id. § 1533(f)(1).
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icance. As Federico Cheever wrote in his thorough 1996 analysis of the role
and significance of recovery plans, section 4(f) “does not require that recovery
plans have the force of law or that the duties they impose bind federal
agencies or anyone else.”77 And while Cheever argued for a greater focus on
recovery and recovery planning in ESA implementation,78 he acknowledged
that the courts had generally been unwilling to find such plans directly
enforceable.79 The Services’ recovery planning guidance clearly states that
recovery plans are nonbinding, but they provide the “central organizing tool
for guiding each species’ recovery process.”80
Section 4(f) allows the relevant Services to appoint “recovery teams”
involving “appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and
other qualified persons” for purposes of developing and implementing
recovery plans.81 The statute itself says little else about recovery teams,
leaving the Secretary with great discretion regarding the formation and
composition of a recovery team for a particular species.82 The Services’
recovery planning guidance offers far more detail, identifying circumstances
where recovery teams may be appropriate,83 and listing both the
advantages84 and disadvantages85 of recovery teams. This guidance suggests
that recovery teams should not always be used; by contrast, the Services
have a longstanding policy of seeking state agency involvement in recovery
plan development and, especially, implementation.86
77.
Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 59 (1996).
78.
Id. at 72–75.
79.
Id. at 59–63 (discussing and citing three cases holding recovery plans unenforceable).
80.
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INTERIM
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE VERSION 1.3,
§ 1.1.1 (2010) [hereinafter RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE].
81.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2) (2006).
82.
In the absence of a recovery team, a recovery plan may be prepared by Service
biologists or by a contractor. RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE, supra note 80, at §§ 2.3.2.2,
2.3.2.3.
83.
“Recovery teams are often appropriate for more wide-ranging species, more
controversial issues, and larger-scope plans.” Id. at Box 2.3.2.4.
84.
Listed advantages include, among others, “increase the depth of expertise (biological
and otherwise) contributing to plan development,” “address and resolve controversial issues
early in the process,” and “facilitate the implementation of recovery actions.” Id. § 2.3.2.4.
85.
Listed disadvantages include, among others, “a tendency for unwieldy and nonproductive meetings,” “difficulties bridging knowledge gaps among scientists, agency
representatives, and other stakeholders,” and “more complications in recovery plan development
due to diverse viewpoints and sheer number of opinions.” Id.
86.
The policy calls for the Services to “[u]tilize the expertise and solicit the
information and participation of State agencies” in developing and implementing recovery
plans. As to implementation, the policy continues, “State agencies have the capabilities to
carry out many of the actions identified in recovery plans and are in an excellent position to
do so because of their close working relationships with local governments and landowners.”
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2. Section 7: Consultation on Federal Actions to
Avoid Jeopardizing Species
ESA section 7 imposes special obligations, both substantive and
procedural, on federal agencies.87 Most important is section 7(a)(2), which
commands that every federal agency “shall . . . insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely
modify its designated critical habitat.88 The statute does not define the
crucial “jeopardy” term, but under the ESA implementing rules, the term
means “to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly
or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.”89 The Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill
declared that this provision showed “beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”90 Although this
case may have been the ESA’s high water mark (at least in the Supreme
Court),91 the jeopardy prohibition of section 7 has remained one of the
strongest standards in environmental law.
Section 7(a)(2) couples the substantive standard of “no jeopardy” with
the mandatory process of “consultation.”92 The Ninth Circuit has explained
the consultation triggers and process as follows:
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action agencies”)
to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife agency . . .
whenever their actions “may affect an endangered or threatened
species.” Thus, if the agency determines that a particular action will
have no effect on an endangered or threatened species, the consultation requirements are not triggered. If the action agency
subsequently determines that its action is “likely to adversely
affect” a protected species, it must engage in formal consultation.
Formal consultation requires that the consulting agency . . . issue a
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Interagency Policy Regarding Role of
State Agencies in ESA Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,274, 34,275, E.1, E.2 (Jul. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter ESA state agency policy].
87.
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
88.
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
89.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012).
90.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
91.
See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 490 (2012) (“Hill has become the extreme outlier in the Court’s
ESA jurisprudence.”).
92.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
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biological opinion determining whether the action is likely to
jeopardize the listed species and describing, if necessary, reasonable
and prudent alternatives that will avoid a likelihood of jeopardy.93
Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to use the best available commercial
and scientific data in carrying out its requirements,94 and does not provide
for consideration of economic factors.95 Under an ESA implementing rule,
however, section 7 applies only to “discretionary” federal actions.96
If the FWS determines in its Biological Opinion (BO) that the
proposed action may jeopardize the species or impair critical habitat, it
must suggest a “reasonable and prudent alternative” (RPA) to avoid jeopardy
while meeting the purposes of the proposal.97 The ESA implementing rules
define RPAs as “alternative actions identified during formal consultation
that can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended purposes
of the action,” that are within the action agency’s authority and jurisdiction,
that are “economically and technologically feasible, and that the Director
believes would avoid the likelihood” of jeopardizing the species or impairing
critical habitat.98 The rules provide that a “jeopardy” BO must include an
RPA unless the FWS is unable to identify one.99
Although they say little about the required content of RPAs, the rules
provide some detail about the process of developing them. First, they
require the FWS to “discuss” the availability of an RPA with the action
agency, along with any applicant seeking approval from that agency.100
Second, they state that the FWS “will utilize the expertise” of the action

93.
Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
94.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
95.
By contrast, designation of critical habitat requires use of the best available scientific data, but also consideration of economic impacts, national security impacts, and other
relevant impacts associated with designating a particular area. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
96.
“Section 7 and the requirements of this part [of the ESA implementing rules]
apply to all actions in which there is discretionary federal involvement or control.” 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.03 (2012); see Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation
Water Project Operations and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3-4 (2008)
(explaining the Supreme Court case upholding this rule, and analyzing its implications for
USBR project operations).
97.
16 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(3)(A) (2006).
98.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012).
99.
Id. § 402.14(h)(3). The ESA implementing rules further provide that after a BO is
issued, the action agency “shall determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the
action in light of its section 7 obligations and the Service’s biological opinion,” and shall
notify the Service of its final decision. Id. § 402.15.
100.
Id. § 402.14(g)(5). The rules define “applicant” as any person “who requires
formal approval or authorization from a federal agency as a prerequisite to conducting the
action.” Id. § 402.02.
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agency and any applicant in identifying RPAs.101 Third, they require the
FWS to make its draft BO available to the action agency upon request, to
allow the agency to analyze the RPA(s); the agency may then provide
comments to the FWS.102 Finally, they provide that in formulating the BO,
including any RPAs, the FWS “will give appropriate consideration to any
beneficial actions taken by the Federal agency or applicant, including any
actions taken prior to the initiation of consultation.”103
Thus, the consultation rules contemplate participation by three entities:
the FWS, the action agency, and the applicant (if any). Unlike species
listing determinations under section 4, there is no notice-and-comment
process that offers an opportunity for stakeholders or interested citizens to
participate.104 And in contrast to the development and implementation of
recovery plans, there is no general policy providing for participation by
state agencies in the consultation process or the development of RPAs.105

3. Provisions Regarding “Take” of Listed Animals
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, section 9 of the
ESA prohibits “take” of any member of a protected species of fish or wildlife.106 This prohibition applies to “any person,”107 and the ESA defines
“person” to include virtually any conceivable entity, including a federal
agency.108 Under the ESA, “ ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.”109 FWS by rule has defined “harm” in this context to include
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife,”110 thus bringing some habitat destruction within the
prohibition of take.111
101.
Id. § 402.14(g)(5).
102.
Id. The applicant may request a copy of the draft BO from the action agency, and
may submit comments on the BO. Id.
103.
Id. § 402.14(g)(8).
104.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4) (2006) (requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures for most listing decisions).
105.
The Services have a policy of seeking information from state agencies in the
process of developing BOs. ESA state agency policy, supra note 86, at 34,275, C.1, C.2. In
the recovery planning context, however, the policy calls on the Services to seek participation
as well as information from state agencies, and to utilize their expertise. Id. at E.1, E.2.
106.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).
107.
Id. § 1538(a)(1).
108.
Id. § 1532(13).
109.
Id. § 1532(19).
110.
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012).
111.
The Supreme Court upheld this rule in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Under ESA section 10, the Services may issue
an Incidental Take Permit to a non-federal entity, allowing legalized “take” of protected
species where the take would be “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
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A federal agency action may incidentally result in a taking of a member
of a listed species, but if the agency has followed the requirements of section 7
with respect to that action, it receives an “incidental take statement” from
the relevant Service authorizing a certain level of take in connection with
that action.112 The incidental take statement must specify the impact of the
anticipated take on the species, along with “those reasonable and prudent
measures that the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to address
such impact.”113 It also prescribes binding terms and conditions for
implementing these reasonable and prudent measures.114
For non-federal actions, the ESA provides a different means of authorizing incidental take of listed animals. Under section 10, the Secretary may
issue an incidental take permit115 to an applicant that has submitted a
conservation plan for a particular activity, specifying the measures the
applicant will take to minimize harm to the species.116 Before issuing the
permit, the Secretary essentially must find that the incidental taking will
not cause jeopardy to the listed species117 and that the applicant will minimize and mitigate harm to the species to the greatest extent practicable.118
While all of these provisions are relevant to the water resources
context, many of the biggest endangered species controversies have arisen
from the application of section 7 to the operation of federal water projects,
and the next Section discusses three river basins where ESA compliance
became a major issue.
otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006). The applicant for such an
incidental take permit must submit a conservation plan, better known as a habitat conservation
plan (HCP), describing (among other things) the applicant’s steps to mitigate or minimize
take and the funding available for these efforts. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
112.
Id. § 1536(b)(4); see Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d
782, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
113.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006).
114.
Id. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv) (incidental take statement “sets forth the terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency or applicant (if any), or both, to
implement the measures specified . . . .”).
115.
Section 10 allows the Secretary to issue certain types of permits, “under such
terms and conditions as he shall prescribe.” Id. § 1539(a)(1). One such permit allows taking
of listed animals that would otherwise be prohibited by section 9, “if such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B).
116.
Such a plan must also identify funding sources available for mitigation, alternative
actions considered by the applicant, and other measures as the Secretary may identify. Id.
§ 1539(a)(2)(A).
117.
The statute does not use the term “jeopardy” here, but requires a finding that the
incidental taking “will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild.” Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). This language matches the key portion of
the jeopardy definition in the ESA implementing rules. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012).
118.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 10 requires other findings as well, including
adequate funding for the plan. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iii).
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B. Section 7 and USBR Projects: Three Examples
One reason why the ESA has generated such heated disputes in the
water context is that it operates so differently from western state water law,
which recognizes property rights in water use and gives top priority to the
oldest ones.119 The ESA does not itself create or obtain water rights for the
flows needed to protect species, but instead operates as a regulatory overlay
on the legal system for water allocation and management.120 The ESA does
not eliminate or directly restrict water rights, but it can limit their exercise
as needed to avoid a take of listed species,121 or jeopardy caused by federal
water management actions.122 If water use is restricted for purposes of
maintaining adequate flows for listed species, the ESA does not necessarily
limit junior users (as state law would), but rather may trump appropriative
rights to curtail the uses most directly responsible for causing harm.123
Because section 7 imposes special duties on federal agencies, the most
vulnerable water uses under the ESA are those with a federal nexus—most
notably, those who receive water from a federal project.124
In order to show how RIPs differ from the usual modus operandi in their
approach to section 7 compliance, this Section discusses three “standard”
consultations on the operation of USBR water projects. Each of the resulting
BOs was challenged in court, and this Section draws from the published
119.
See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
120.
See, e.g., Cnty. of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting challenge to restrictions on irrigation diversions, imposed through
consultation on permits for ditches crossing federal lands; court noted that the issue was one
of federal regulatory power rather than water rights).
121.
“The Act provides no exemption from compliance to persons possessing state
water rights . . . .” United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134
(E.D. Cal. 1992) (enjoining irrigation diversions by district, which had improperly screened
pumps that were killing and injuring listed salmon in violation of the section 9 take
prohibition).
122.
See, e.g., Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Or. 2001) (rejecting
claims by irrigators that they had legal rights to the water from the Klamath Project despite
the USBR’s need to avoid jeopardy in operating the project; the court stated that “as recognized by this court and the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs’ contract rights to irrigation water are
subservient to ESA and tribal trust requirements”).
123.
See David E. Filippi, The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Water Rights and
Water Use, 48 PROC. ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22–1, 22–11, 22–25 (2002) (describing how
ESA restrictions on water use to protect listed species in the Walla Walla River conflicted
with water right priorities under state law).
124.
Some federal project water users have sued for compensation, arguing that they
have lost water due to ESA restrictions and claiming a breach of contract and/or a taking of
property rights. The results have been mixed, and several of the leading cases are still being
litigated. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011). See generally Douglas L.
Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation of Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking
of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331 (2006).
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opinions in these cases to explain both the consultation and the resulting
litigation. It concludes with a brief discussion of subsequent developments,
as negotiations followed litigation in all three river basins.

1. Lower Colorado
Lake Mead, at the end of the Grand Canyon, is one of the most
important federal reservoirs, providing major water supply and hydropower
benefits for the Lower Colorado River Basin states (the “Lower Basin
states”) of Arizona, California, and Nevada.125 The USBR operates Lake
Mead (Hoover Dam) in accordance with the “Law of the River,” an extensive set of compacts, statutes, court decrees, and treaties governing the
allocation of the Colorado River’s limited and highly variable water
supplies.126 The USBR’s operations on the Lower Colorado may affect a
number of listed species,127 but the original ESA dispute over Lake Mead
operations focused on the southwestern willow flycatcher; as its name
implies, the flycatcher occupies willow habitat, and disappearance of such
habitat along southwestern rivers was a major reason the species was listed
in 1995.128
As a result of several dry years in the Colorado River Basin, however,
new flycatcher habitat appeared in a precarious place: the Lake Mead delta,
at the upper end of the reservoir. Low lake levels allowed willows to grow
up in the temporarily dry lakebed, and they eventually took over 1,148
acres, representing “the second largest continuous patch of native willow
habitat known to exist in the Southwest.”129 By the mid-1990s, however,
wetter weather allowed the USBR to refill the reservoir, causing destruction
of the willow habitat and “take” of flycatchers occupying these trees.130
After the USBR submitted its biological assessment in 1996, FWS delivered a draft BO concluding that project operations on the Lower
125.
These benefits include providing irrigation water for 2.4 million acres in California,
Arizona, and Mexico, and municipal water supply for a population of over 20 million in the
Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, Nevada). Hoover Dam is also one of the world’s
largest producers of hydropower. Boulder Canyon Project—Hoover Dam, U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Boulder%20Canyon
%20Project%20-%20Hoover%20Dam (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
126.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS 2008
xxxvii–xli, 1-1 to 1-6 (2010).
127.
See id. at 3-11 to 3-13 (identifying species affected by Lower Colorado operations
including various fish species, the Yuma clapper rail, Southwestern willow flycatcher, and
flat-tailed horned lizard).
128.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Rule Determining Endangered Status for
the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694, 10,707 (Feb. 27, 1995).
129.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 517 (9th
Cir. 1998).
130.
Id.
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Colorado for the next five years would cause jeopardy to the flycatcher.
This draft BO found that loss of the willow habitat in the Lake Mead Delta
could prove catastrophic, and emphasized the need to protect this existing
habitat from inundation. The RPA that FWS issued required the USBR,
among other things, “to use the full scope of its authority and discretion to
immediately protect and maintain the 1148 acres of riparian habitat” in the
lakebed—essentially blocking the re-filling of Lake Mead. If the USBR
could not protect the Lake Mead habitat, it had to preserve habitat at a
nearby reservoir, Lake Roosevelt, by temporarily filling the lake no higher
than an elevation of 2,136 feet.131 As of January 1997, FWS believed that
jeopardy to the flycatcher could not be avoided without these measures.132
After receiving the draft BO for comment, the USBR pushed back,
insisting it had limited discretion in operating Lake Mead and could not
avoid refilling the reservoir to protect flycatchers.133 FWS deferred to the
USBR on this point, and in the final BO it no longer required protection of
the existing habitat at Lake Mead, or the fallback habitat at Lake Roosevelt.
Instead, the FWS produced a new RPA relying on a short-term program of
acquiring and protecting about 1,400 acres of currently unprotected
habitat—preferably (but not necessarily) habitat already occupied by
flycatchers. All of the habitat had to be protected by 2001 (with the first
500 acres by 1999), but the RPA did not specify any particular parcels of
habitat, or require any of it to be established before the Lake Mead Delta
habitat was wiped out.134 The RPA did call for additional long-term
measures, however, including provision of additional habitat and continued
development of a “Multi-Species Conservation Program” for the Lower
Colorado River.135

131.
The USBR had to defer using the Lake Roosevelt storage space above 2,136 feet
“until suitable flycatcher habitat could be developed elsewhere.” Id. at 518. Lake Roosevelt,
northeast of Phoenix, is part of the USBR’s Salt River Project. Salt River Project, U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Salt%20
River%20Project&pageType=ProjectPage (last updated Aug. 19, 2011).
132.
Sw. Center for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 518.
133.
The USBR took the position that it could lower Lake Mead only for purposes of
river regulation, improvement of navigation, flood control, irrigation, domestic uses, and
power production. Id. This position prevailed in a later case involving the Lower Colorado
River, as the court held that the “Law of the River” left the USBR with no discretion to
operate its projects for the benefit of ESA-listed species located in Mexico. See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2003). Because section 7 applies only to
discretionary federal actions, the scope of the USBR’s discretion in project operations is
crucial for purposes of determining the nature and extent of the agency’s ESA duties. See
Benson, supra note 96, at 32–55.
134.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 518.
135.
Id. at 518–19. The Multi-Species Conservation Program is discussed infra at notes
197–207 and accompanying text.
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The Southwest Center for Biological Diversity filed suit to protect the
Lake Mead Delta habitat, arguing that the USBR’s operations were violating
the ESA and that the RPA was arbitrary and capricious. The district court
granted summary judgment to the government on the RPA claim, rejecting
arguments that the RPA failed to avoid jeopardy;136 the court upheld the
RPA despite the flycatcher’s “precarious status”137 even though the final
RPA was far weaker than the draft in requiring protection of existing flycatcher habitat.138 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had little trouble upholding
the district court, and explained that the ESA imposes few requirements on
RPA selection:
[T]he Secretary was not required to pick the first reasonable
alternative the FWS came up with in formulating the RPA. The
Secretary was not even required to pick the best alternative or the
one that would most effectively protect the Flycatcher from
jeopardy. The Secretary need only have adopted a final RPA which
complied with the jeopardy standard and which could be implemented by the agency.
Secondly, under the ESA, the Secretary was not required to explain
why he chose one RPA over another, or to justify his decision based
solely on apolitical factors. Accordingly, the district court had no
reason to address the possible factors that might have motivated
the Secretary in rejecting the draft RPA or to address the merits of
Southwest’s argument that the Secretary improperly rejected the
draft RPA based on Reclamation’s bare assertion that it lacked the
discretion to lower the water level at Lake Mead.139
The court went on to uphold the district court’s determination, based on
the record, that the final RPA satisfied these requirements.140 Thus, Southwest
Center shows that the government has vast discretion in choosing an RPA,
so long as it can make and support a finding of no jeopardy.

2. Klamath
The Klamath River Basin straddles the Oregon–California line, and the
USBR’s Klamath Project delivers water for irrigation in both states.
136.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119,
1129, 1134 (D. Ariz. 1997).
137.
Id. at 1131.
138.
Id. at 1128–31, 1133.
139.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 523 (citations and footnotes omitted).
140.
Id. (explaining the rationale in support of the FWS finding of no jeopardy, and
stating that the plaintiff had provided no convincing evidence to the contrary).
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Operation of this project, along with hydropower dams and non-project
irrigation,141 has dramatically altered the Klamath Basin ecosystem to the
detriment of several types of fish. Two species of suckers were listed under
the ESA in 1988, followed by coho salmon in the Klamath River in 1997.142
These listings effectively put the squeeze on Klamath Project operations,
because the suckers need certain water levels for their habitat in Upper
Klamath Lake—the main source of irrigation water storage for the project—
while the salmon require releases from the lake to provide adequate flows to
maintain habitat and water temperatures in the Klamath River.
The USBR began consulting in the early 1990s on annual operating
plans for the Klamath Project, but because the latter part of that decade was
relatively wet, the project was able to meet fish habitat requirements without
reducing irrigation deliveries.143 The good times ended in 2000, however, as
the weather turned abruptly dry that summer and remained so through the
winter.144 By early 2001, the USBR was facing both a historic drought in
the Klamath Basin, and a court order to complete consultation before
delivering irrigation water from the project. The resulting BOs divided
nearly all of the year’s limited water supplies between the lake (for suckers)
and the river (for salmon), leaving none for most Project irrigators.145 The
decision brought loud protests, both from the farming communities of the
Klamath Basin (where some people engaged in civil disobedience) and from
politicians sympathetic to their plight.146
The following year, the USBR produced a new ten-year operating plan
for the Klamath Project, and consultation on this plan with the NMFS
resulted in a ten-year BO regarding impacts on coho salmon.147 The USBR
had essentially proposed to release enough water to replicate recent average
flows in the Klamath River, and also develop a “water bank” to provide up
to an additional 100,000 acre-feet of water to be dedicated to salmon.148 The
BO found that project operations would cause jeopardy to the coho, and
provided an RPA to avoid that result. The RPA specified the Klamath
141.
See Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin
Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 197, 201–09 (2002).
142.
Id. at 216–18.
143.
Id. at 218–20.
144.
Id. at 221–22.
145.
Id. at 223–27.
146.
Id. at 198–99, 228.
147.
The new operating plan was based partly on a 2002 report by the National
Research Council, finding a lack of scientific support for the flow recommendations of the
2001 BO on the effect of Klamath Project operations on salmon. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of
Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2005).
148.
The average flow varied by water year type, so the average flow for a dry water
year would be lower than for a wet year, and the USBR’s biological assessment proposed to
provide similar flows based on the year type. Id. at 1088.
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River flows needed to avoid jeopardy, based on coho habitat requirements
and the need to maintain suitable summer water temperatures.149 For the
first eight of the ten years, however, the RPA allowed flows in the river to
be significantly lower; for the period from 2006–2010, flows could be as low
as 57% of the long-term requirements.150 The gap between the flows salmon
need, and the flows the project would provide, reflected the RPA’s “organizing
principle” that the USBR should be responsible for no more than its share
of overall water use in the Klamath Basin. “Because the project irrigates 57
percent of the land in the basin, the RPA provided that the BOR would
provide 57 percent of the water needed for the coho, and establish an intergovernmental workgroup to ‘develop the other 43 [percent] of the flows.’ ”151
Fishing and conservation groups challenged the Klamath Project BO,
and the courts rejected two of its key features.152 First, the RPA provision
allowing the USBR to provide only 57% of the necessary Klamath River
flows was held to be arbitrary and capricious. The district court found that
the NMFS had improperly relied on “actions that were ‘not reasonably
certain to occur’ when it determined that the coho would receive 100
percent of the flows through a collaborative process.”153 But the district
court upheld the RPA’s phased approach, even though it effectively ensured
that flows would fall well below the specified long-term levels for the first
eight years of the ten-year period.154
The Ninth Circuit reversed on this latter point, finding that the BO
had not adequately explained its conclusion that the coho would not be
jeopardized as a result of eight years of flows lower than those deemed
necessary for the species’ long-term survival. Seeing no analysis to support
this conclusion, the court rejected the NMFS’s argument that the BO
reflected the agency’s expert judgment in an area where the science was
uncertain.155 The court found that the RPA laid out a clear rationale for the
long-term flow requirements, but no rationale for why salmon would not be

149.
Id. at 1089.
150.
Id. at 1088–89.
151.
Id. at 1088.
152.
The district court upheld the determination of long-term flow needs for coho,
however, and the plaintiffs did not appeal on this point. See id. at 1089.
153.
See id. There was no appeal on this point, but the Ninth Circuit stated, “The
proper baseline analysis is not the proportional share of responsibility the federal agency
bears for the decline in the species, but what jeopardy might result from the agency’s
proposed actions in the present and future human and natural contexts.” See id. at 1093.
154.
See id. at 1089–90.
155.
Id. at 1094. “The agency essentially asks that we take its word that the species will
be protected if its plans are followed. If this were sufficient, the NMFS could simply assert
that its decisions were protective and so withstand all scrutiny.” Id. at 1092.
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jeopardized by eight years of much lower flows.156 Noting that five generations of coho in the Klamath River would be affected by these low flows,
the court faulted the BO’s failure to explain how the RPA nonetheless
avoided jeopardy, declaring that an agency may not “provide only partial
protection for a species for several generations without any analysis of how
doing so will affect the species.”157 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court for “appropriate injunctive relief,” stressing that “[i]t is not
enough to provide water for the coho to survive in five years, if in the
meantime, the population has been weakened or destroyed by inadequate
water flows.”158 The litigation over the 2002 Klamath Project BO illustrates
that an RPA may be vulnerable to challenge, despite the Service’s expertise,
if the “no jeopardy” conclusion relies on a faulty view of the law or a weak
explanation of effects on the species.

3. Middle Rio Grande
The “Middle” Rio Grande is a 170-mile stretch of river in New Mexico
between Cochiti Dam and the headwaters of Elephant Butte Reservoir.159
Flows in this reach are heavily influenced by the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District (MRGCD), which diverts water for irrigation of
more than 60,000 acres of the Rio Grande Valley.160 The MRGCD has
contracts to receive water from two USBR projects, the Middle Rio Grande
Project and the San Juan–Chama Project; several other New Mexico water
users, notably the City of Albuquerque, also have San Juan–Chama
contracts.161 Operation of these projects became subject to the ESA when
the Rio Grande silvery minnow was listed as an endangered species in
1994.162 Once abundant throughout much of the Rio Grande watershed, the
156.
Id. at 1093–94. The court noted, for example, that the RPA set long-term July
flows at 1,000 cfs, but the RPA would allow flows as low as 570 cfs from 2006–2010. Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 1095.
159.
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978–79 (D.N.M.
2002) (describing the various reaches of the 170-mile Middle Rio Grande, which is segmented
by several major diversion dams).
160.
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003),
vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
161.
See 333 F.3d at 1122–27 (discussing these two projects and their associated
contracts).
162.
See, e.g., Sean O’Connor, The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and the Endangered
Species Act, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673 (2002); Beth Richards, The Pump Don’t Work Because the
Bureau Took the Handle: The United States Bureau of Reclamation’s Discretion to Reduce Water
Deliveries to Comply with the Endangered Species Act, 4 WYO. L. REV. 113 (2004); Ethan R.
Hasenstein, Frankenstein and Pitbull? Transmogrifying the Endangered Species Act and “Fixing”
the San Juan–Chama Project after Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 34 ENVTL. L. 1247
(2004).
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minnow had been extirpated from all but the “middle” reach and faced
extinction because its river habitat had been dramatically altered by dams,
diversion structures, and low flows.163
In the late 1990s, with the silvery minnow populations continuing to
decline despite the ESA listing,164 the USBR initiated section 7 consultation
on its project operations.165 In its 1999 biological assessment, however, the
USBR argued that its operating discretion was limited by its water delivery
obligations. The USBR contended, and the FWS agreed,166 that the USBR
could not reduce deliveries to users holding contracts for San Juan–Chama
Project or Middle Rio Grande Project water, regardless of the ESA.
Environmental groups challenged the resulting BO on operation of these
projects, and although the district court found that the government did
indeed have discretion to reduce water deliveries for the minnow’s
benefit,167 Federal District Judge James A. Parker nonetheless upheld the
BO because the FWS had “come up with an interim solution to avoid
jeopardy” that “may be workable.”168
In September 2002, however, the FWS—in the midst of extreme
drought conditions169—issued a new BO that allowed the key reach of the
Rio Grande to go dry, potentially wiping out the last wild population of
silvery minnows.170 Judge Parker refused to approve the new BO, which
found the minnow would be jeopardized by the USBR’s operations but
contained no RPA.171 His opinion pointedly criticized the USBR for allow-

163.
Final Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow As an Endangered Species, 59
Fed. Reg. 36988 (July 20, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In listing the species as
endangered, FWS also identified other factors for the silvery minnow’s decline, including
competition from non-native species. Id. at 36989.
164.
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229 (D.N.M.
2002) (noting evidence of decline of silvery minnow populations since 1994).
165.
Joan E. Drake, Contractual Discretion and the Endangered Species Act: Can the Bureau
of Reclamation Reallocate Federal Project Water for Endangered Species in the Middle Rio Grande?,
41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487, 496–97 (2001).
166.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 998–99 (D.N.M. 2002)
(noting that FWS adopted the USBR’s legal position regarding the USBR’s limited discretion in operating the projects).
167.
Id.
168.
Id. at 999–1000. The court noted that FWS had reached this solution “in coordination with all the major players in the middle Rio Grande basin.” Id. at 999.
169.
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–28.
170.
Id. at 1231–32 (noting that the USBR had proposed to allow the “all-important”
San Acacia reach—home to nearly all of the remaining wild minnows—to dry up, and that
“extensive river drying in the San Acacia Reach could result in the extinction of the silvery
minnow in the wild”).
171.
“There appears to be no precedent, and the parties have presented none, for a
Court to affirm a BO that has a finding of jeopardy with no RPA . . . .” Id. at 1226. The
court stressed that only the Endangered Species Committee, often called the “God Squad,”
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ing a crisis to develop by delivering full water supplies in 2002 despite the
obvious drought conditions, by waiting to reinitiate consultation until nearly
all the available water was gone,172 and finally by refusing to release stored
water for minnow survival in order to protect water users from future
shortages.173 Although the ESA allows agencies “to consider the interests of
others besides an endangered species if they can at the same time avoid
jeopardy to the endangered species, it is not allowable for agencies to give
paramount weight to the interests of others when by doing so they have no
proposal to avoid jeopardy.”174 The court ordered the USBR to provide
certain minimum flows through 2003.175
A divided Tenth Circuit panel affirmed Judge Parker’s decision on the
scope of the USBR’s discretion regarding project operations.176 Within
months, the panel’s decision was vacated as moot,177 but by then the FWS
had already issued a new BO for project operations.178 In addition,
Congress partially undid the Court of Appeals decision through an appropriations rider prohibiting use of water from the San Juan–Chama Project
(except for water leased or purchased from willing sellers) to meet the
requirements of the ESA, and declaring that compliance with restrictions in
a March 2003 BO would fully satisfy ESA section 7.179 The original “minnow
had the power to allow a federal agency action that would jeopardize a listed species. Id. at
1224–25.
172.
Id. at 1225–26.
173.
Id. at 1233–34.
174.
Id. at 1227.
175.
The court allowed lower flows for the remainder of 2002 than would have been
allowed under the 2001 BO. For 2003, the court required the USBR to maintain the flows
provided in 2001 BO unless and until a new one was issued. Id. at 1237–38.
176.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as
moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
177.
Id. at 1222. The court found the appeal moot for various reasons, including a
subsequent Congressional enactment relating to the San Juan–Chama Project, the effective
expiration of Judge Parker’s injunction, and favorable climatic conditions that had resulted in
better habitat for the minnow. Id. at 1219–21.
178.
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (D.N.M.
2005) (new BO issued in March 2003).
179.
The statute stated in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior,
acting through the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation . . . may not use
discretion, if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any water stored in Heron
Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-Chama Project contracts, including
execution of said contracts facilitated by the Middle Rio Grande Project, to meet
the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, unless such water is acquired or
otherwise made available from a willing seller or lessor and the use is in compliance
with the laws of the State of New Mexico, including but not limited to, permitting
requirements.
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rider” locked in the 2003 BO for two years,180 but Congress soon extended
that period to ten years.181 Responding to the outcry in New Mexico against
the Tenth Circuit decision,182 Congress sought to give a measure of certainty
to the City of Albuquerque and other water users on the Middle Rio
Grande.183 The silvery minnow story demonstrates that ESA restrictions on
traditional water deliveries can provoke a strong political backlash, and
Congress always has the last word in deciding whether species will be
protected.184
While the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle Rio Grande consultation stories produced three different morals, they also have some notable
similarities. Each consultation resulted in a BO that found jeopardy to a
listed species based on the USBR’s project operations. Each BO was
challenged in federal court and litigated up through a court of appeals. And
as explained in the next Part, each of these disputes—perhaps surprisingly—
was followed by some type of negotiation or collaborative process focused
on the needs of the listed species.

(b) Complying with the reasonable and prudent alternatives and the incidental
take limits defined in the Biological Opinion released by the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service dated March 17, 2003 combined with efforts carried out
pursuant to Public Law 106-377, Public Law 107-66, and Public Law 108-7 fully
meet all requirements of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) for
the conservation of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) and
the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher (Empidonax trailii extimus) on the Middle
Rio Grande in New Mexico.
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108–137, § 208, 117 Stat.
1827, 1849–50 (2003).
180.
Id. § 208(d), 117 Stat. 1850.
181.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 205(d), 118 Stat. 2935,
2949 (2004).
182.
See Lara Katz, History of the Minnow Litigation and its Implications for the Future of
Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 675, 683–85 (2007) (describing
a Congressional field hearing in Belen, New Mexico, where the 10th Circuit decision was
criticized by all witnesses except a representative of the environmental plaintiffs).
183.
Id. at 685–87 (quoting New Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman as saying, among other
things, that the rider was needed to provide “some level of certainty for water users”);
Michael Connor, Commentary on “History of the Minnow Litigation and Its Implications for the
Future of the Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande,” 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 693, 694 (2007)
(describing the rider as “providing some level of certainty for water users but still necessitating
changes in the way water is used in the Middle Rio Grande”). Connor, now Commissioner
of the USBR, was Senator Bingaman’s primary water staff person at the time of the rider. Id.
at 693.
184.
Congress has acted to override the ESA before. One of the earliest major ESA
controversies involved the endangered snail darter and the nearly completed Tellico Dam.
After the U.S. Supreme Court famously held in T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), that
finishing the dam would jeopardize the species in violation of the ESA, Congress ordered
the dam completed nonetheless. 125 CONG. REC. S23,872 (Sept. 10, 1979).
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4. Further Developments: Negotiation Follows
Consultation and Litigation
On the Middle Rio Grande, the “minnow rider”—while protecting
water users and preventing legal challenges to the 2003 BO—also provided
for an Endangered Species Collaborative Program.185 Specifically, Congress
directed the Interior to establish an executive committee “for purposes of
improving the efficiency and expediting the efforts of the Endangered
Species Collaborative Program Workgroup,” with members from the
USBR, the FWS, a New Mexico state agency, MRGCD, and other
identified stakeholders.186 The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species
Collaborative Program continues to this day; its home page describes it as
“a partnership involving 16 current signatories organized to protect and
improve the status of endangered species along the Middle Rio Grande
(MRG) of New Mexico, while simultaneously protecting existing and
future regional water uses . . . . Program activities include water acquisition
and management, habitat restoration, endangered species monitoring, and
silvery minnow propagation.”187
In the Klamath Basin, continuing declines in salmon and other
fisheries—and related conflicts over water management and other issues—
led to major negotiated agreements188 in the latter half of the last decade.189
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) was the product of
185.
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 209,
117 Stat. 1827, 1850 (2003).
186.
The other designated seats on the executive committee are assigned to “other
federal agencies” (besides the USBR and the FWS), municipalities, agricultural communities,
and Middle Rio Grande Pueblos (six Indian communities located along this reach of the
river); one seat was also reserved for “universities and environmental groups.” Id.
187.
MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM,
http://www.mrgesa.com (last visited July 12, 2012). The USBR is the lead agency for the
Collaborative Program. Id. Current signatories include the USBR, the FWS, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and the Army Corps of Engineers; the City of Albuquerque and its water
utility; MRGCD and an association of its patrons; four New Mexico state agencies; four
Indian Pueblos; and the University of New Mexico. History, MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM, http://www.mrgesa.com/Default.aspx?
tabid=175 (last visited July 12, 2012). Environmental groups, however, are conspicuously
absent. The website also explains how the program was prompted by efforts to resolve the
silvery minnow litigation, and grew out of an ESA Workgroup organized by the USBR and
the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission. Id.
188.
This article focuses on the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, but there is also
a related Klamath Hydropower Settlement Agreement. See Klamath Restoration: Background,
KLAMATHRESTORATION.GOV, http://www.klamathrestoration.gov/about-us/background (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
189.
For an excellent summary of the factors contributing to the formation of these
agreements, see Hannah Gosnell & Erin Clover Kelly, Peace on the River? Social-Ecological
Restoration and Large Dam Removal in the Klamath Basin, USA, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES, no.
2, 2010 at 361.
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three years of negotiations involving federal and state agencies (both Oregon
and California), tribes, local governments, water users, and conservation
groups.190 The KBRA was designed to produce “effective and durable
solutions” to restore and sustain natural fish populations throughout the
basin and ensure reliable water and power supplies for agriculture and other
uses.191 Existing irrigation was not fully protected, however, as the KBRA
set limits on water diversions for the USBR’s Klamath Project that would
result in deliveries of about 100,000 acre-feet less than demand in very dry
years.192 This wide-ranging and detailed agreement193 also addresses
“regulatory assurances,” including ESA compliance,194 and suggests that the
Services should avoid further restrictions on irrigation deliveries in any
future consultation on Klamath Project operations.195 The KBRA requires
congressional approval, however, and is currently stalled due to Tea Party
opposition.196
For purposes of this article, however, the Lower Colorado River MultiSpecies Conservation Program (MSCP) is most significant because it figures
prominently in section 7 compliance for the USBR’s Lower Colorado River
operations. The MSCP has been described as “a cooperative effort between
Federal and non-federal entities” that serves three purposes: “conserving
habitat and working toward the recovery of threatened and endangered
species, as well as reducing the likelihood of additional species being listed;
accommodating present water diversions and power production and optimizing opportunities for future water and power development . . . and

190.
SUMMARY: KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1, 10-11 (2010), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/kbra/docs/Web%20KBRA%20updates/Summary_of_Klamath_
Basin_Restoration_Agreement.pdf (this summary gives no indication of who wrote it, but it
can be found on the website for the USBR’s Klamath Basin Area Office).
191.
Id. at 1.
192.
Id. at 4.
193.
The KBRA has nearly 40 sections covering over 170 pages, plus nearly 200 pages
of appendices. KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF
PUBLIC AND TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (2010), available at
http://www.klamathrestoration.gov/sites/klamathrestoration.gov/files/Klamath-Agreements/
Klamath-Basin-Restoration-Agreement-2-18-10signed.pdf.
194.
Id. at 143–62. The ESA material, id. at 153–59, addresses both section 7 and
section 10 compliance.
195.
Id. at 158–59 (stating that if Services find jeopardy in a future BO on Klamath
Project operations, “before seeking any further limitations on diversion, use, and reuse of
water related to the Klamath Reclamation Project beyond the limitations provided in . . .
this Agreement, NMFS and FWS will consider, to the maximum extent consistent with the
ESA,” certain specified alternative approaches).
196.
William Yardley, Tea Party Blocks Pact to Restore a West Coast River, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2012, at A16. The deal’s opponents see the federal government as being more
concerned with fish than farmers, and suggest that the KBRA is related to an environmentalist
campaign to remove larger dams in the Columbia River system. Id.
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providing the basis for incidental take authorizations.”197 Thus, the MSCP
is designed not only to benefit species and their habitat while allowing for
ongoing and future water uses, but also to provide coverage against
potential “take” liability for both federal and non-federal actors.
Efforts to launch the MSCP date to 1995, when Interior and state
agency representatives from Arizona, California, and Nevada signed an
initial agreement to develop the program.198 Although still far from
complete, the MSCP appeared in the 1997 BO for USBR operations on the
Lower Colorado, as continued development of the MSCP was a long-term
element of the RPA.199 By 2005, the process produced a conservation plan
with several types of elements, including maintaining and creating habitat
for covered species, avoiding and minimizing impacts from water use and
development activities, implementing “population enhancement measures”
for covered species, and conducting monitoring and research activities.200
Along with federal and state agencies, the MSCP also covers dozens of
water and power providers (primarily cities and special districts) in the
three Lower Basin states.201 In order to provide a basis for take coverage for
state and local entities, the conservation plan developed through the MSCP
serves as a habitat conservation plan under ESA section 10.202 In 2005, the
Interior Secretary determined that the plan was legally sufficient to serve as
the basis for an Incidental Take Permit for the non-federal participants.203
The MSCP also covers a range of federal agency actions, including the
USBR’s Lower Colorado River operations relating to water management,
flood control, and hydropower production.204 For these federal activities,
the MSCP’s conservation plan is geared toward avoiding jeopardy to listed
species or adverse modification of their critical habitat, as required by
section 7. In 2005, the FWS issued a BO for the federal actions addressed in
197.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, LOWER COLORADO
MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN 2 (2005), available at www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/
rec_of_dec_apr05.pdf.
198.
Id. at 8.
199.
Id. at 5–6; see supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
200.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, LOWER COLORADO
MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 197, at 10–11. “Covered species,” only
some of which are listed under the ESA, are identified on pages 17–18, and conservation
measures for these species are more specifically described on pages 18–20.
201.
Id. at 16 (listing participating entities from each of the three states).
202.
Id. at 8–9 (explaining that MSCP participants requested that the plan provide
coverage under both section 7 and section 10 of the ESA because of some uncertainty
regarding which section might be relevant for particular entities).
203.
Id. at 12–15 (summarizing section 10 criteria and explaining how the plan met
them).
204.
Id. at 16–17 (also explaining covered activities of the FWS, the National Park
Service, the Western Area Power Administration, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the
Bureau of Land Management).
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the MSCP, including the USBR’s non-discretionary operations on the
Lower Colorado.205 This BO reached a “no jeopardy” conclusion,206 and
provided an incidental take statement that incorporated the conservation
measures from the MSCP, requiring the USBR and other federal agencies
to undertake these measures in order to gain take coverage under section 7.207
Thus, on the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle Rio Grande,
consultation produced litigation, which was followed by negotiations on
addressing the needs of water users and listed species. Conflicts over the
application of the ESA to water management and use have also given rise to
several established collaborative efforts, including the Edwards Aquifer
RIP208 and the Missouri River Recovery Implementation Committee209 as
well as the four RIPs discussed below. The next Section examines these
four programs, with a particular emphasis on their relationship to section 7
compliance.

205.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL AND
CONFERENCE OPINION ON THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION
PROGRAM 18–22 (2005) (listing USBR activities on the Lower Colorado, but stating that
some activities are non-discretionary and therefore not subject to consultation requirements).
206.
Id. at 130.
207.
Id. at 135–38.
208.
For an excellent review of the early years of the Edwards Aquifer ESA controversy,
see Todd Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater
Law, and Private Property Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845
(1998). ESA litigation in the 1990s initially drove the need to protect the habitat of several
listed species that depend on spring flows fed by the aquifer. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan,
1993 WL 151353 (W.D. Tex. 1993). After years of local and state-level efforts to control
groundwater use for the protection of endangered species, the FWS initiated development
of a RIP for the Edwards Aquifer in 2006. ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM (EARIP) SUMMARY 2 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistoryMarch2010.pdf.
209.
The Corps of Engineers’ operation of Missouri River reservoirs generated a flurry
of litigation in the dry years of the early 2000s, including separate cases brought by several
states. See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). Environmental
groups also challenged the Corps’ ESA compliance. Am. Rivers v. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
271 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2003). All of this litigation prompted new Missouri River
biological opinions and operating plans, which were eventually upheld by the courts. In re
Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005). The Missouri River
Recovery Implementation Committee (MRRIC) initially grew out of a 2003 consultation on
the Corps’ Missouri River operations; the Corps agreed to “form an advisory group . . .
made up of a broad group of stakeholders from all states along the River, [to] make recommendations on potential actions that could be undertaken to improve the functioning of the
River while minimizing impacts to human uses.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2003
AMENDMENT TO THE 2000 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE MISSOURI
RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM 25, 259 (Dec. 16, 2003) (on file with author). Later,
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Army to establish the MRRIC in section 5018 of
the 2007 Water Resources Development Act. Pub. L. 110-114, § 5018, 121 Stat. 1041, 1199
(2007).
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III. RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PLANS FOR
RIVER-DEPENDENT SPECIES
Beginning with the pioneering Upper Colorado program in the 1980s,
the RIP has increasingly become the preferred means of ESA compliance in
the context of western water management and use. These programs have
spread to the San Juan210 and Platte Rivers,211 and a new RIP was recently
approved for the Middle Rio Grande in New Mexico.212 No two programs
are alike, both due to the unique characteristics of each river system and the
lack of statute or rule language specific to RIPs;213 thus, there is no defined
or standard RIP approach to ESA implementation, only a set of programs
with some similar elements.
This Section briefly describes the origins and purposes of the Upper
Colorado, San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio Grande RIPs, the roles that
states and stakeholders play in them, and the ways that they relate to ESA
section 7 compliance. It concludes by summarizing the legal success and
political support these programs have attained.

A. A Big-Picture Look at RIPs
1. Origins
The earliest RIP dates to 1987, when the Recovery Implementation
Program for Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin
was finalized.214 Many entities played a key role in developing the Upper
Colorado RIP, including the USBR and the FWS, the States of Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming, and representatives of water users and environmental
groups.215 Following the completion of the RIP Program Document, the
Interior Secretary and the governors of the three states signed a Cooperative
Agreement216 in which all the parties agreed to participate in and implement
the recovery program set forth in that document.217
This original RIP arose out of controversy regarding the application of
ESA section 7 to water use and development activities in the Upper
210.
211.

San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM (2006) [hereinafter Platte River RIP ROD].
212.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16.
213.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
214.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12.
215.
Id. at 1-1. The acknowledgment page of the Upper Colorado RIP Program Document credits a “task group” of eleven people, each representing a specific interest. Id. at i.
216.
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1988). The Administrator
of the federal Western Area Power Administration also signed the document. Id.
217.
Id.
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Colorado River Basin. Three fish species in the basin had been listed under
the ESA, and a fourth was a candidate for listing due to habitat loss and
various other factors.218 By the mid-1980s FWS had issued numerous
jeopardy opinions regarding the operations of both existing and proposed
water projects, putting new water development in serious doubt.219 After
trying and failing to obtain ESA relief in Congress and the courts,220 water
users began seeking an administrative solution that would comply with
existing law while also allowing continued water use and development in
the basin.221 In 1984, an Upper Colorado River Coordinating Committee
was formed under a Memorandum of Understanding among the FWS, the
USBR, and the three states, and this committee provided the forum for the
years of negotiations that would eventually produce the Upper Colorado
RIP.222
As the oldest RIP, the Upper Colorado program provided a sort of
template for those that followed in the San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio
Grande. Moreover, the later RIPs would originate much like the first one
did. Although the details obviously vary, there are two major common
elements to all the RIP’s creation stories.
Initially, each RIP grew out of a contentious (or potentially contentious)
section 7 consultation on one or more water projects in a particular river
basin. The San Juan River Basin RIP, established in the early 1990s, was
prompted by jeopardy opinions on the USBR’s soon-to-be-built Animas–La
Plata Project in southwestern Colorado, and on completion of the partially
built Navajo Indian Irrigation Project.223 The San Juan Basin, which was

218.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-3 (identifying
species and causes for their decline).
219.
See Hannah Gosnell, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and the Art of Compromise: The Evolution of a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative for the Animas-La Plata Project, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 561, 571–72 (2001); Tom Pitts, The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish
Recovery Program: A Success Story, IRRIGATION LEADER, Oct. 2010, at 24.
220.
See Gosnell, supra note 219, at 571.
221.
Id. at 572; Pitts, supra note 219, at 24 (describing Colorado Water Congress
endangered species initiative).
222.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-6. One of the key
players in developing the RIP was Tom Pitts, representing the Colorado Water Congress. Id.
at i. According to Pitts, it was the Colorado Water Congress that proposed a focus on recovery
and delisting of the fish species (rather than simply avoidance of jeopardy), because recovery
would best fulfill the ESA’s goals while providing maximum regulatory certainty for water
use and development. Pitts, supra note 219, at 24; Telephone Interview with Tom Pitts,
Water Consult, Co-founder, in Loveland, Colo. (June 20, 2012).
223.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 10–11. For a detailed and
fascinating account of the events leading up to the formation of the San Juan RIP, see
Gosnell, supra note 219, at 578–609. Gosnell’s article focuses chiefly on the Animas–La Plata
Project, but discusses the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project consultation at 602–06.
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carved out in the early stages of negotiating the Upper Colorado RIP,224
developed its own fish recovery program as part of the RPA that allowed
Animas–La Plata to be constructed.225 The Platte River RIP arose out of
consultations regarding existing water projects in both Colorado and
Nebraska,226 with jeopardy opinions issued in 1994 and 1997, respectively.227
Consultation on operation of the USBR’s water projects on the North
Platte was essentially put off pending development of the RIP in the 1990s
and 2000s.228 The latest RIP is being launched in the midst of a new
consultation on federal water project operations in the Middle Rio Grande
of New Mexico.229 As noted above, earlier consultations in this basin
produced years of litigation and a congressional rider that effectively
blocked litigation over the existing BO, which expires in 2013.230
In addition, every RIP was preceded by years of negotiations involving
representatives of the FWS, the USBR, state officials, and others. As noted
above, the Upper Colorado RIP took over three years to negotiate once the
Upper Colorado River Coordinating Committee was formed in 1984.231 The
San Juan RIP was developed relatively quickly, although it still took twoplus years from the beginning of discussions on an Animas–La Plata Project
RPA in the summer of 1990,232 to the signing of the Cooperative
Agreement establishing the RIP in October 1992.233 By contrast, the Platte
RIP took more than a decade following the initial, 1994 federal–state
Memorandum of Understanding that launched the process toward an ESA

224.
See Gosnell, supra note 219, at 572–73 (noting the absence of any jeopardy
opinions in the San Juan Basin in the mid-1980s, and the expected difficulty of working with
New Mexico state water officials).
225.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 19–21; Tom Pitts, The San
Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program: An Ongoing Success Story, IRRIGATION
LEADER, June 2011, at 8–9.
226.
See John Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative
Watershed Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559, 565–70 (describing
how consultations in Colorado and Nebraska, along with political factors, led to an initial
Platte River agreement in 1994 and a later one in 1997).
227.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 25–26. Remarkably, the RPAs for these
opinions relied on the work-in-progress RIP—which would not be finalized until 2006—to
provide the long-term measures needed to avoid jeopardy. Id.
228.
See id. at 26–27.
229.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 6 (noting
that FWS issued a ten-year BO for the Middle Rio Grande in March 2003), 19 (noting
connection between the RIP and “the [contemplated] 2013 programmatic BO(s)”).
230.
See supra notes 164–184 and accompanying text.
231.
See supra notes 214–222 and accompanying text.
232.
See Gosnell, supra note 219 at 590. Another source indicates that such discussions
began in 1989. Pitts, supra note 225, at 8.
233.
Pitts, supra note 225, at 9.
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program for the basin;234 a later agreement set up a Governance Committee
of state, federal, and stakeholder representatives to negotiate the program.235
The new Middle Rio Grande RIP is a product of the Middle Rio Grande
Endangered Species Collaborative Program,236 which began working to
address ESA issues in the basin even before a 2002 agreement that formalized
the program’s governance.237 The Executive Committee for the Collaborative
Program first decided in August 2009 to turn the Middle Rio Grande
program into a RIP,238 although the draft program document would take
another three years to complete.239

2. Purposes
Every RIP has seemingly coequal goals: benefiting certain listed
species with an eye toward recovery, and providing ESA compliance for
existing uses and future development of water resources. Some of the RIP
documents are quite specific about these twin goals, others less so, and the
wording varies from one program to another. Despite these differences,
however, all the RIPs seek to achieve these two primary ends.
Program documents for the San Juan and Middle Rio Grande RIPs
make this point very clearly at the outset. The latter document states the
RIP’s general purpose as:
To protect and improve the status of species listed pursuant to the
ESA within the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) by implementing certain recovery activities to benefit those species and their associated
habitats . . .
and, simultaneously,

234.
Echeverria, supra note 226, at 567. In fact, efforts to develop a Platte River
program date to 1985, when a committee was formed to conduct a “Platte River Management
Joint Study,” which proceeded for roughly a decade but was ultimately rejected by the State
of Wyoming. E-mail from Tom Pitts, Water Consult, to Reed D. Benson, Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law (Oct. 10, 2012, 11:38 MDT) (on file with author).
The Platte River RIP was finalized in 2006. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211.
235.
Echeverria, supra note 234, at 570–73.
236.
See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
237.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 5 (noting
that Congress first appropriated funds for Collaborative Program activities in 2001, and the
MOU regarding program governance was signed in Apr. 2002).
238.
MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY PROGRAM UPDATE, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2009 at 2 (2009).
239.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16 (dated July 12,
2012). This document remains incomplete, however, both in the main text (see pp. 15, 18,
and 21) and especially the appendices (see p. 26).
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To protect existing and future water uses while complying with
applicable state and federal laws, rules and regulations, and to serve
as the ESA coverage vehicle for water uses and management in the
MRG Program area.240
The San Juan RIP makes a similar statement on page one, stating as dual
goals “to conserve populations” of listed fish species in the basin consistent
with ESA recovery goals, and “to proceed with water development” in the
basin consistent with federal and state law.241
The Platte RIP documents are somewhat less straightforward on this
point, but they too reflect the need to provide for water use and development
while conserving listed species and their habitat. The agreement establishing
the Governance Committee stated these as the first two aims of the
program.242 The Secretary’s decision to implement the RIP states, “The
Program will assist in the conservation and recovery of the target species in
the Basin and implement relevant parts of the recovery plans thereby
providing ESA regulatory compliance for effects to the target species’ river
habitats from existing and new water-related activities in the Basin . . . .”243
The Governance Committee alternative was selected because it “best meets
the obligations of Interior to conserve and protect threatened and endangered
species while continuing to provide water supplies for Reclamation projects
and [FWS] activities.”244
The Upper Colorado RIP program document, perhaps surprisingly,
seems to state a single “ultimate goal”: to recover the target species to the
240.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 3.
241.
This statement reflects the water development interests of Indian tribes in the
San Juan Basin, referring “federal trust responsibilities to the Southern Ute Indian Tribe,
Ute Mountain Indian Tribe, Jicarilla Apache Nation, and the Navajo Nation.” San Juan RIP
Program Document, supra note 13, at 1.
242.
The 1997 Cooperative Agreement among Interior and the three states stated that
the intent of the program was to:
(1) secure defined benefits for the target species and their associated habitats to
assist in their conservation and recovery through a basin-wide cooperative
approach that can be agreed to by the three states and the Department of the
Interior (DOI); (2) serve as the reasonable and prudent alternative to offset the
effects of existing and new water related activities in the Platte River Basin that,
in the absence of such a Program, would be found by FWS to be likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of the target species or adversely modify designated
critical habitat;
as well as to avoid further species listings and to mitigate the impacts of new water-related
activities. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER
EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE
RIVER, NEBRASKA, 2–3 (1997).
243.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 4.
244.
Id. at 3.
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point where it would not require ESA protection.245 But it also summarizes
the interests of each of the participants in developing the program, including
the interests of the states in water development, the USBR in reservoir
operations, and water users in protecting existing legal regimes for
allocation.246 It then declares that each of the participants “is committed to
the successful implementation of a recovery program that will provide for
recovery of the endangered fish species, consistent with Federal law and all
applicable State laws and systems for water resource development and
use.”247 And it makes no bones about why the RIP came about: “The primary
impetus for developing this recovery program was to provide a mechanism
to resolve the Section 7 conflict in the upper basin.”248

3. State and Stakeholder Roles
Another standard feature of RIPs is the importance of state officials
and stakeholder representatives in both the development and implementation
of the programs. As noted above, every RIP was preceded by years of
discussions on water and ESA issues,249 and with the possible exception
of the San Juan program,250 the majority of key players were representatives
of state governments or stakeholder groups. The “task group” that produced
the Upper Colorado RIP program document had four state officials, four
stakeholder representatives, and three federal officials.251 The Governance
Committee for development of the Platte RIP had three representatives of
the basin states, five stakeholder representatives, and two Interior officials.252
245.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-1.
246.
Other identified participants include the FWS, with its ESA responsibilities, and
conservation groups, with their interests preserving the species and their habitat. Id. at 1-1,
1-3.
247.
Id. at 1-3.
248.
Id. at 1-9.
249.
See supra notes 231–239 and accompanying text.
250.
The San Juan RIP was not preceded by an agreement that defined the participation
and ground rules of the formative negotiations, so unlike the other RIPs, there was no
official team that developed the program. One source states that “in 1989, water users, tribes,
federal agencies, and the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah began discussing ESA
compliance for water projects in the San Juan Basin, initially focusing on the Animas–La
Plata Project.” Pitts, supra note 225, at 8. Gosnell’s account of the search for an Animas–La
Plata RPA focuses on the roles of the USBR and the FWS, but also indicates that water
users were actively involved while environmentalists chose to sit out the process. Gosnell,
supra note 219, at 590–96.
251.
Two of the state officials were from Wyoming, while Colorado and Utah had one
each. The stakeholder representatives included two from water user organizations and two
from conservation groups. Two of the three federal officials were from the USBR, the other
from the FWS. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at i.
252.
Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming each had one representative. The five stakeholder
representatives included three from water user organizations and two from conservation
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The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program
Executive Committee, which began moving toward a RIP in 2009,253
currently has seats for three federal agencies, three state agencies, four
Indian pueblos, and five stakeholder groups.254
In addition, each of the RIPs was finalized through the signing of a
cooperative agreement by the Interior Secretary, governors of the participating states, and sometimes others. Federal officials and three governors
signed the Upper Colorado agreement in 1988.255 Four years later, the San
Juan RIP agreement was signed not only by the Interior Secretary and the
governors of Colorado and New Mexico, but also by leaders of three Indian
tribes in the Four Corners area;256 the State of Utah and the Navajo Nation
chose not to sign, although the Navajos eventually did in 1996.257 The
Interior Secretary and the governors of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming
signed the Platte RIP agreement in 2006,258 following the Secretary’s
decision to choose the plan negotiated by the Governance Committee.259 As
of this writing, a cooperative agreement is still being developed for the new
Middle Rio Grande RIP,260 but it is clear that parties will need to sign onto
that cooperative agreement in order to participate.261
groups. The USBR and the FWS each had one seat. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR
PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES
HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE RIVER, NEBRASKA 9–10 (1997).
253.
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
254.
Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program, Bylaws 5–6, 8
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.mrgesa.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ObkRkJtOTM
M%3D&tabid=222&mid=580. The bylaws state that the Executive Committee is composed
of certain entities that have signed a MOA, id. at 8; the bylaws also list fifteen entities that
have been “invited to sign the MOA,” including the FWS, the USBR, and the Corps of
Engineers on the federal side; three state agencies; four pueblos; the City of Albuquerque;
the water utility authority serving Albuquerque and Bernalillo County; the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, which primarily supplies irrigation water; and one seat each
for agricultural and conservation groups, neither of which is specified. Id. at 5–6.
255.
See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text.
256.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 50–55 (signature pages of the
1992 Cooperative Agreement). The Jicarilla Apache, Southern Ute, and Ute Mountain Ute
tribes signed the agreement in 1992.
257.
Id. at 11. The State of Utah, however, has never come aboard. Id. at 29. Gosnell,
supra note 219 at 602–06, explains the Navajo Nation’s concerns and objections at the time
the original Cooperative Agreement was signed.
258.
PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 4 (2006).
259.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211211, at 8.
260.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 26.
261.
Id. at 10–11. It appears, however, that this forthcoming cooperative agreement may
be signed by the FWS, agency personnel, and stakeholders, rather than by the Interior
Secretary and state and tribal elected officials. Id. (describing who is eligible to serve on the
RIP executive committee, and indicating they would sign “a Cooperative Agreement with
the Service,” meaning the FWS).
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The RIPs are somewhat less uniform regarding another state role:
funding program operations. States collectively provide half the total cost
of the Platte RIP (although only 16% of the cash),262 a small fraction (less
than 10%) for the Upper Colorado RIP,263 and none for the San Juan
RIP.264 Funding for the Middle Rio Grande RIP is not yet settled, although
it seems likely that the vast majority of the money will be federal,265 as is
true in the other programs.
Once adopted, every RIP gives states and stakeholders a continuing
role in carrying out the program by awarding them seats on a standing
committee responsible for implementation. Each program gives this
committee a different name: the Recovery Implementation Committee in
the Upper Colorado,266 the Coordination Committee in the San Juan,267 the

262.
Under the Platte RIP authorizing legislation, “States shall contribute not less than
50 percent of the total contributions necessary to carry out the Program.” Platte River
Recovery Implementation Program and Pathfinder Modification Project Authorization, Pub.
L. No. 110-229, § 515(b)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 754, 848 (2008). Only $30 million in cash is
required from the states, however, compared to a federal spending authorization of $157
million. Id. §§ 515(b)(3)(B)(i), 515(b)(6)(A). Contributions of water or land for the program
are to make up the rest of the states’ share of the cost, although “in-kind goods or services”
may also be allowed if approved by the Governance Committee. Id. §§ 515(b)(3)(B)(ii),
515(b)(3)(C).
263.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 5-3 ($200,000 out of a
$2.3 million annual budget in the original program document). The percentage of state
funding is slightly smaller today, as state contributions have roughly doubled to just under
$400, but the total annual budget has nearly tripled to around $6.5 million. COLORADO
RIVER RECOVERY PROGRAM FY 2012 DEPLETION CHARGE AND ANNUAL BUDGET
ADJUSTMENTS (2011), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documentspublications/budget-documents/cpitbl/cpitbl12.pdf.
264.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34 (explaining federal funding
sources for program). The states of Colorado and New Mexico provide cost-share funding
for certain capital projects under the program, although the federal share is much larger. Id.
at 43.
265.
“It is anticipated that funding to the RIP will be provided by entities to address
ESA covered actions. Funding can be provided in the form of cash or in-kind contributions.
Reclamation’s authorizing language requires non-federal entities to provide a 25 percent cost
share . . . .” Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 23. Federal
agencies contributed around 90% of the cost of ESA activities on the Middle Rio Grande
from 2001–2011. Id.
266.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1 to 3-3 (one seat
each for the FWS, the USBR, and an official from the Western Area Power Administration;
one seat for each of the three states; one seat each for water development interests and
conservation groups).
267.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34. One seat each is for
participants in the program; participants as of 2010 were four federal agencies, two states,
four Indian tribes, “water development interests,” and “conservation interests.” Id. at 29.
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Governance Committee in the Platte,268 and the Executive Committee in
the Middle Rio Grande.269 Similarly, the RIPs vary regarding whether and
how new entities may be added to these committees.270
The ground rules of these RIP committees ensure that the participating
states and stakeholders have great influence in program decision-making.
The Upper Colorado RIP Implementation Committee operates by consensus.271 The other committees can act only through supermajority vote,
including two-thirds for the San Juan RIP Coordination Committee272 and
three-quarters for the Middle Rio Grande RIP Executive Committee.273
Remarkably, the Platte RIP Governance Committee can act only by affirmative votes of nine out of its ten members, including all of the state and
federal government representatives.274 These decision rules allow relatively
small minorities—in some programs, even outliers—to keep a RIP from
changing course over their objections.

4. Recovery Actions
Implementation efforts focus on a set of recovery actions, developed by
each program to benefit the listed species in each basin.275 Each RIP has
268.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19 (one vote each for the three states,
one vote each for three categories of water users, two votes for conservation groups, and two
votes for the Interior Department).
269.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 10. The
initial membership is the same as the Collaborative Program Executive Committee. See supra
note 254.
270.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-2 (“[O]ther agencies
may participate if they execute an agreement in support of this program.”); San Juan RIP
Program Document, supra note 13, at 29 (no vote of the Coordination Committee needed if
the State of Utah should sign the RIP cooperative agreement), 34 (indication that new
participants may be added without them signing the cooperative agreement); Platte River
RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19 (no indication that Governance Committee may be expanded);
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 10-11 (describing
process and criteria for adding new entities to the Executive Committee).
271.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1. The document
does not define “consensus.”
272.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34. (“Unresolved issues will
be referred for resolution to the Signatories” of the cooperative agreement for the RIP.).
273.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 13. However,
certain matters can only be changed by unanimous consent, including provisions of the RIP
declaring that the program will not impair water rights or compact obligations, that the RIP
will acquire water only from willing sellers, and the “principles governing ESA compliance
and regulatory predictability under the RIP.” Id. at 13, 22–23. In all matters, however, the
committee “shall seek consensus in reaching decisions.” Id. at 13.
274.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19.
275.
This statement is not meant to suggest that the years spent developing the plans
were spent entirely on negotiations, particularly in areas of significant scientific uncertainty.
For example, the Governance Committee requested a National Academy of Sciences review
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generated (or will generate) a list of more-or-less specific measures relating
to particular species and their ecosystems. These measures provide the
elements of long-term plans designed to move the species toward recovery,276
and these plans guide the work and funding delivered by the programs.277
The San Juan RIP program document explains that the “Long Range Plan
(LRP) identifies multi-year research, monitoring and recovery actions
necessary to support the program’s goals . . . . The LRP is the Program’s
research, monitoring, and implementation document.”278
A detailed, program-by-program review of recovery prescriptions is
beyond the scope of this article, but each RIP has identified certain categories
of actions that are necessary to help the species recover, or at least help the
program understand what is needed for recovery. The San Juan RIP, for
example, identifies five categories: (1) “protection, management, and
augmentation of habitat,” which includes providing adequate flows in the
San Juan River and resolving barriers to fish passage; (2) “water quality
protection and enhancement;” (3) “interactions between native and nonnative fish species,” primarily involving efforts to reduce predation and
competition from other types of fish; (4) “monitoring and data management,”
including assessing the status and trends of fish populations and the
progress toward recovery; and (5) “protection of genetic integrity and
management and augmentation of populations,” which includes raising and
stocking endangered fish while safeguarding the genetic diversity of the
wild populations.279 The Upper Colorado RIP’s five listed recovery
elements are not much different280—not surprisingly, as this program
of the science underlying the Platte River program, which began in January 2003 and took
over two years to complete. See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 7–8.
276.
The Upper Colorado program refers to its long-term plan as the Recovery Implementation Program Recovery Action Plan (RIPRAP). The RIP program participants
developed this plan “using the best, most current information available and the recovery
goals for the four endangered fish species. It identifies specific actions and time frames
currently believed to be required to recover the endangered fishes in the most expeditious
manner in the Upper Basin.” UPPER COLORADO ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM,
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM RECOVERY ACTION PLAN (RIPRAP), preface
(2012), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/foundationaldocuments/RIPRAP/RIPRAPapril4-03.pdf.
277.
The Middle Rio Grande RIP is still developing its long-term plan, but once
completed it will become a “guidance document that provides an inventory describing
beneficial activities that may be implemented by the RIP to meets its purposes and goals,”
and will provide a foundation “for the ongoing 5-year RIP Action Plan.” Middle Rio Grande
RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 14–15.
278.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 1, 13.
279.
Id. at 13, 14–21 (providing additional detail on these categories).
280.
The primary differences are that the Upper Colorado list has two habitat elements
instead of one, and does not have a water quality category. See Upper Colorado RIP Program
Document, supra note 12, at 1-6 to 1-8.
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covers the same two fish species as the San Juan RIP, plus two others.281
And the Middle Rio Grande RIP—driven primarily by the needs of the Rio
Grande silvery minnow—can be expected to adopt similar categories of
measures as the program takes shape.282
The Platte RIP recovery elements are different from the others in at
least two notable respects. First, because three of the four target species are
birds that rely on lands and meadows along the Central Platte River,283 this
program focuses more on riparian lands than the others.284 One of its two
major habitat goals is summarized as “Land Habitat Restoration: protect
and/or restore 10,000 acres of habitat in the Central Platte area,”285 while
the other is to provide an annual average of 130,000 to 150,000 acre-feet to
improve flows in the Central Platte.286 Second, the Platte RIP is explicitly
incremental in its approach to habitat restoration: in the current “First
Increment” of thirteen years,287 the program seeks to provide only about
one-third of land and water that FWS believes is required for the species’
habitat needs.288 In other words, the RIP is not seeking to meet all the
habitat needs of the species in its first thirteen years, but only to provide a
down payment of the necessary land and water for the Central Platte.289
281.
The Upper Colorado RIP focuses on four listed fish species: the bonytail chub,
Colorado pikeminnow (formerly called squawfish), humpback chub, and razorback sucker
(which was listed after the RIP was created). Upper Colorado RIP Program Document,
supra note 12, at 2-1. The San Juan RIP focuses on the Colorado pikeminnow and razorback
sucker. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 9–10.
282.
The RIP’s long-term plan will include “categories of RIP activities including:
physical habitat restoration and management; water management; predator/non-native
control; population augmentation/propagation (silvery minnow only); water quality
management (silvery minnow only); research, monitoring and adaptive management;
policies and laws; public information and outreach; and Program management.” Middle Rio
Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 14.
283.
The bird species are the interior least tern, piping plover, and whooping crane; the
fish species is the pallid sturgeon. See PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, SUMMARY, S-31 to S-33 (2006),
available
at
https://www.platteriverprogram.org/PubsAndData/ProgramLibrary/TCR190%20PRRIP%20FEIS%20Summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Platte
RIP FEIS Summary].
284.
Id. at S-36 to S-38 (describing habitat characteristics needed to benefit the species).
285.
Id. at S-35.
286.
Id. A third goal is to “test the assumption” that pallid sturgeon habitat in the
Lower Platte can be improved by managing flows in the Central Platte. Id.
287.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & FISH &
WILDLIFE SERVICE, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOL. 1, at 1-1, 1-2 (2006).
288.
Id. at 1-3 (summarizing the FWS objectives of 29,000 acres of habitat protected/
restored along the Central Platte, and average annual flow improvements of 417,000 acrefeet).
289.
See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 4 (“Interior proposed a phased
Program to address habitat restoration with the Program’s First Increment achieving roughly
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A common theme of the RIPs’ approach to conservation is their reliance
on adaptive management principles for making decisions. Adaptive
management is a “learning by doing” approach that employs certain
techniques: “identify key questions in relationship to multiple hypotheses,
develop and utilize predictive tools to evaluate management action choices,
design and implement management ‘experiments,’ conduct linked monitoring
and research, and reassess hypotheses and management actions.”290 A 2011
article by a member of the Platte RIP implementation team offers a
detailed explanation of that program’s use of adaptive management.291 The
Upper Colorado and San Juan RIP program documents do not use the
term, but do call for decisionmaking using adaptive management principles.292
The newer Middle Rio Grande RIP program document contains a whole
section on the subject, declaring that the RIP will “use adaptive management as a structured and systematic approach for designing, implementing,
monitoring and evaluating management actions to maximize learning about
critical scientific questions and uncertainties that affect management
decisions . . . .”293

5. Approach to Section 7 Compliance
As noted above, one of the two major purposes of every RIP is to
ensure compliance with ESA section 7 for existing water use and management
activities in the river basin, as well as for new water development actions.294
The approach to section 7 compliance is therefore a crucial feature of the
Upper Colorado, San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio Grande RIPs, and the
program documents for each one address the matter in some detail. Here
again, each program is somewhat unique, but several features appear in
most or all of these RIPs.

one-third of these land and river flow improvements . . . while allowing for
monitoring and research to increase understanding of the species’ needs and the most
effective ways to provide habitat improvements.”). Whether the Platte RIP will deliver
further “payments” remains to be seen, however; additional land and water may depend on
several factors, including results of studies on the habitat needs of the species.
290.
Chadwin B. Smith, Adaptive Management on the Central Platte River: Science,
Engineering, and Decision Analysis to Assist in the Recovery of Four Species, 92 J. ENVTL.
MGMT. 1414, 1416 (2011).
291.
Id.
292.
See Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 4-20, 4-21
(describing research, monitoring, and data management as recovery elements); San Juan
RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 13-14 (describing the program’s Long Range Plan as
relying heavily on research and monitoring to develop recovery measures and assess their
effectiveness).
293.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 20.
294.
See supra notes 240–248 and accompanying text.
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First, each RIP is meant to provide the necessary measures to avoid
jeopardy (and adverse modification of critical habitat) that would otherwise
result from federal actions relating to water management and development.
Many such actions had already been the subject of section 7 consultations
prior to development of the RIPs, and the FWS had issued jeopardy opinions
based on flow depletions and other adverse effects on the species and their
habitats.295 Anticipating more jeopardy opinions, the RIP participants
intended that certain program recovery measures would provide the RPAs
that would allow these actions to proceed.296 In the words of the Upper
Colorado RIP, “Activities and accomplishments under the RIP are intended
to provide the reasonable and prudent alternatives which avoid the likelihood
of jeopardy to the continued existence of the endangered Colorado River
fishes . . . resulting from depletion impacts of new projects and all existing
or past impacts related to historic projects . . . .”297 Providing predetermined RPAs is probably the most legally and practically important feature
of the RIPs.298
Second, three of the four RIPs provide for ongoing FWS review to
ensure the program is actually making progress,299 considering both the
implementation of recovery actions and the status of the species.300 The San
Juan RIP, for example, provides that at the time a section 7 consultation is
initiated, FWS “will determine if progress toward recovery has been sufficient for the Program to serve as a reasonable and prudent alternative or
measure,”301 and will “assess the sufficiency of Program actions in proportion to the potential impacts of a proposed federal action.”302 This type of
295.
See supra notes 223–230 and accompanying text.
296.
“The RIP is intended to provide the reasonable and prudent alternatives for
projects undergoing Section 7 consultation in the upper basin.” UPPER COLORADO
ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, AGREEMENT, SECTION 7 CONSULTATION,
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS, AND HISTORIC PROJECTS § II (1993, revised 2000) [hereinafter
Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement].
297.
Id. § III.1. Certain discharges of pollutants by historic projects are not covered,
however. The RIP is also intended to provide the RPAs that avoid destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat. Id.
298.
This feature is common to all the RIPs. See id. (Upper Colorado); San Juan RIP
Program Document, supra note 13, at 69; Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 5
(providing RPA for previously completed consultations and “ESA offsetting measures” for
not-yet-completed ones, including “the ongoing operations of Federal water projects in the
Basin”); Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 15–16, 19–20.
299.
The exception is the Platte RIP, which does not call for such periodic determinations
by FWS, but only provides more generally for adaptive management and monitoring as
program elements. Platte RIP FEIS Summary, supra note 283, at S-41, S-42.
300.
See Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 16.
301.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 69. The Upper Colorado RIP
includes a similar provision. Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement supra note 296, § III.5.
302.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 69. The San Juan and Upper
Colorado RIPs have nearly identical criteria for such determinations, addressing the benefits
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determination is not triggered solely by new consultations, however. The
San Juan RIP also requires the FWS every two years to prepare “a written
‘Sufficient Progress’ Assessment of the Program’s Progress towards recovery,
the Program’s ability to provide ESA compliance for water development
and management activities, and any corrective actions needed to ensure
future ESA compliance, in accordance with the Program’s Principles.”303
Such “sufficient progress” determinations are made every year for the Upper
Colorado RIP,304 and the Middle Rio Grande RIP also requires the FWS to
issue them annually.305
Third, the RIPs requiring “sufficient progress” determinations give
detailed instructions in case the FWS should determine that the program is
not making sufficient progress to serve as an RPA. The first option in the
San Juan and Upper Colorado is simply to specify which RIP recovery
measures must be implemented in order to avoid jeopardy due to a particular
action.306 If the FWS believes that the program does not include the
necessary measure(s) to avoid jeopardy, however, it must give the RIP
implementation committee the chance to resolve the issue. In the Middle
Rio Grande, the FWS may document a lack of sufficient progress and
formally ask the committee to remedy the issue; “It is fully intended that it
will be feasible for the [committee] to take whatever corrective actions are
needed to achieve sufficient progress and that resolution will occur.”307 The
San Juan RIP allows the committee to incorporate new measures suggested
by FWS into the program’s long-term plan, although that is “expected to be
of RIP actions for the species, the status of fish populations, the adequacy of flows, and the
magnitude of impacts resulting from the activity undergoing consultation. Id. at 36; Upper
Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement supra note 296, § II.
303.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 32. The FWS is also required
to notify the RIP Coordination Committee in writing if the FWS “concludes, at any time
and independent of any consultation, that the Program is not implementing actions on
schedule, and that this may impact the ability of the Program to provide reasonable and
prudent alternatives or measures.” Id. at 71.
304.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REGION 6, FINAL 2011–2012 ASSESSMENT OF
“SUFFICIENT PROGRESS” UNDER THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH
RECOVERY PROGRAM IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN, AND OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF ACTION ITEMS IN THE JANUARY 10, 2005, “FINAL PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION
ON THE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ENDANGERED FISHES IN THE YAMPA RIVER BASIN” 1-2
(July 18, 2012), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/
section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2012SufficientProgressMemo.pdf (indicating annual
nature of “sufficient progress” determinations).
305.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 16.
306.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 70; Upper Colorado RIP § 7
Agreement, supra note 296, § III.6, at 2. The latter provision requires FWS to confer with
the RIP Management Committee to identify such measures.
307.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 17. If the
problem is not resolved, the FWS may conclude that sufficient progress has not been
maintained, which “may or may not trigger re-initiation of consultation.” Id.
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a rare event.”308 The Upper Colorado RIP suggests that the committee may
revise existing recovery measures as needed to “restore” the RIP as an
RPA.309 If that should fail, however, “as a last resort the FWS will develop”
an RPA, working with the federal agency and project sponsor.310 In short,
all these programs emphasize that the RIP provides the actions needed to
avoid jeopardy, and should the FWS find that the RIP is falling short, the
implementation committee is expected to find the solutions.311
With this approach to ESA compliance, the RIPs seek to provide
increased certainty—and perhaps decreased burdens—for water-related
activities subject to section 7 consultation requirements. The Platte River
RIP Environmental Impact Statement goes into remarkable detail on these
points, not only stating that the RIP would “provide ESA ‘regulatory
certainty’ ” for covered activities,312 but also detailing the stiffer requirements
and greater costs that could result from consultations in the absence of a
RIP.313 The Middle Rio Grande RIP says it most plainly, declaring that the
program participants “intend that the inclusion of the RIP as the conservation
measure in the new BO provides regulatory certainty under the ESA” for
the covered actions.314

B. The Legal (and Political) Success of RIPs
This Article focuses primarily on the creation, structure and procedures
of RIPs, rather than on their success in achieving their stated goals. One
certainly could say, however, that the established RIPs in the Upper Colorado,
San Juan, and Platte River Basins have succeeded from a legal standpoint.315
This is true in at least three respects, each involving a different branch of
government.
308.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 70.
309.
Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement, supra note 296, § III.8, at 3-4.
310.
Just in case anyone should miss the point, this statement is followed by the
parenthetical, “(RIP participants recognize that such actions would be inconsistent with the
intended operation of the RIP.)” Id., § III.11, at 4.
311.
This is true even though all the programs recite, in somewhat different terms, that
final determinations regarding jeopardy remain with the FWS. Id., §§ II, at 1-2; San Juan
RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 71; Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program
Document, supra note 16, at 16.
312.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOL. 2, at 2 (2006).
313.
Id. at 3–6. It also declared, “It is highly likely that the basin-wide costs to achieve
ESA compliance for projects under separate section 7 consultations (nonstreamlined) would
be greater than the costs associated with a cooperative, basinwide [RIP].” Id. at 11.
314.
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 15–16.
315.
It is too soon to say whether the brand-new Middle Rio Grande RIP will succeed
in the same ways.
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The first legal success involves ESA compliance, one of the two main
purposes of these programs. In every situation thus far where FWS has
determined whether a RIP does enough to avoid jeopardy, the RIP has
passed the test. The FWS has issued an unbroken string of “sufficient
progress” determinations for the Upper Colorado RIP from 1995 through
2012.316 The San Juan RIP has a much shorter record, but the FWS has
found sufficient progress both times it has assessed the program (2005 and
2010);317 moreover, the FWS found sufficient progress in issuing a “no
jeopardy” opinion for the new Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project,318
which will bring treated water from the San Juan River to many areas of the
Navajo Nation that have lacked a potable water source.319 The Platte RIP
plan resulted in a 2006 “no jeopardy” opinion covering the effects of
Reclamation project operations and other activities in the basin,320 and the
FWS has done hundreds of streamlined consultations relying on the
program.321 Thus, at the administrative level, the RIPs have delivered the
envisioned section 7 compliance.
316.
See Sufficient Progress Process, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY
PROGRAM, http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/section-7-consultation/
sufficient-progress-letters.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). This page contains links to
seventeen of these determinations, one for every year except 2007, which range in length
from two pages (1995) to fifty-four pages (2009). Each one concludes that the RIP provides
sufficient progress to avoid jeopardy for projects with depletions below a certain threshold,
which has been 4,500 acre-feet since 2001. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., REGION 6, SUFFICIENT PROGRESS/SECTION 7 CONSULTATIONS—UPPER COLORADO
RIVER RECOVERY PROGRAM (July 20, 2001), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/
documents-publications/section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2001July20.pdf. For several
years in the last decade, however, the FWS stated that it was “very concerned about recent
downward trends in endangered fish populations.” See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REGION 6, FINAL 2007–2008 ASSESSMENT OF “SUFFICIENT PROGRESS”
UNDER THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM IN THE UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN (July 3, 2008), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/
documents-publications/section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2008Jul03.pdf.
317.
E-mail from David Campbell, San Juan River RIP, to author (Aug. 15, 2012, 07:03
MDT) (on file with author).
318.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. FINAL BIOLOGICAL
OPINION FOR THE NAVAJO-GALLUP WATER SUPPLY PROJECT 74–83 (2009), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/EIS/navgallup/FEIS/vol2/Appdx-C/Appdx-C-pt3.pdf.
319.
See Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/navajo/nav-gallup/index.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2012) (summarizing the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, and noting that Congress authorized it
through Pub. L. 111-11 in 2009).
320.
See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 17–18, 25–28.
321.
“During the Cooperative Agreement Era (1997–2006), approximately 400 streamlined Section 7 consultations were done. To date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
provided nearly 100 streamlined Section 7 consultations since the Program began.” PLATTE
RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, BI-ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 & 2010 (2011),
available at https://www.platteriverprogram.org/News/Documents/PRRIP Biannual Report
2009-2010.pdf.
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Second is litigation—or rather the absence of it—over whether the
RIPs are meeting ESA requirements. The Upper Colorado and San Juan
RIPs have for years provided section 7 compliance for over 2,300 water
projects, including every USBR project in the Upper Colorado River Basin,
with no lawsuits challenging the adequacy of this compliance.322 Neither has
the Platte RIP been the subject of ESA litigation,323 despite the number
and significance of the projects relying on the program for their section 7
compliance.324 The judiciary has decided many cases regarding federal water
projects and endangered species in the last twenty years,325 but the RIPs
have been remarkably successful in keeping these issues out of the courts.
Third, Congress has acted to provide authority and funding for implementation of the three established RIPs. The first statute came in 2000,326
authorizing up to $46 million for the USBR to carry out capital projects
under the Upper Colorado and San Juan programs,327 and also allowing the
Interior Secretary to use up to $6 million in Colorado River Storage Project
hydropower revenues for annual base funding of the RIPs.328 Over time,
Congress extended the authority and increased the funding for capital
projects;329 the 112th Congress extended the base funding through 2019 by
approving a bipartisan bill, H.R. 6060.330 The Platte RIP got its authorizing legislation in 2008,331 allowing the Secretary to take certain actions in
322.
Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 6060
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, Water and Power Subcommittee, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of John W. Shields, Interstate Streams Engineer, Wyoming State Engineer’s
Office) [hereinafter Shields Testimony].
323.
Telephone Interview with Jerry Kenny, Executive Director, Platte River Recovery
Implementation Program, in Kearney, Neb. (Aug. 16, 2012).
324.
See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 25–27 (six existing water projects on
the Colorado Front Range requiring special use permits from the U.S. Forest Service; major
hydropower projects in Nebraska requiring relicensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; USBR water projects on the North Platte; and a large number of “small
depletions” projects).
325.
See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
326.
Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basins Endangered Fish Recovery Programs,
Pub. L. 106-392, 114 Stat. 1602 (2000).
327.
Id. § 3(a), 114 Stat. 1603. The total cost of these capital projects was capped at
$100 million, id. § 3(b), and the statute identified the sources of the other $54 million. Id.
§ 3(c), 114 Stat. 1604.
328.
These expenditures were capped at $4 million per year for the Upper Colorado
and $2 million per year for the San Juan in 2000 dollars, to be adjusted for inflation over
time. Id. § 3(d), 114 Stat. 1604–1605.
329.
See Shields Testimony, supra note 322 (summarizing statutory changes made in the
107th, 109th, and 111th Congresses).
330.
Pub. L. 112-270 (2013), introduced as the Endangered Fish Recovery Programs
Extension Act of 2012, H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced with eight Republican
and five Democratic cosponsors).
331.
Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-229, § 515, 122 Stat.
754, 847 (2008).
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implementing the program332 and authorizing over $157 million in federal
money.333 Thus, Congress has not only shown its support of the RIPs, but
has backed that support with significant investments in federal resources.
These attributes—highly reliable section 7 compliance for the water
sector, cooperation rather than litigation over ESA requirements, and
significant federal contributions to these programs—have earned the RIPs
political support from western states, water users, and political officials who
are not known as enthusiastic supporters of the Endangered Species Act.
For example, eight House Republican members of the conservative Western
Caucus were original co-sponsors of H.R. 6060,334 even though the caucus’s
website harshly criticizes the ESA and suggests the law should be
scrapped.335 Testifying in support of this bill, a Wyoming state official
described “substantial grassroots support” from the federal, state, tribal, and
stakeholder participants in the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs: “These
diverse interests continue to demonstrate that working cooperatively
produces far greater results than independent efforts.”336 Another witness
explained that he had once supported repeal and replacement of the ESA,
but he now supported H.R. 6060 on behalf of several Colorado water
suppliers,
because it is the best way to avoid uncertainty and the economic
and social costs experienced by other areas of the West that have
been plunged into chaos by conflicts between water supply needs
and endangered species. The risks of not having a successful Program
are far too great . . . . [T]hose risks include years of litigation at
best, and potentially a devastating disruption of water supplies that
are critically important to cities, agriculture and industry.337
332.
Id. § 515(b)(2).
333.
Id. § 515(b)(6), 122 Stat. 849.
334.
Reps. Bishop and Chaffetz (both from Utah), Lummis (Wyoming), Pearce (New
Mexico), Gosar (Arizona), and Tipton, Gardner, and Coffman (all from Colorado), all
Republicans, are listed as sponsors of H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012). All of them are also
listed as members of the Western Caucus for the 112th Congress. Membership, CONG. W.
CAUCUS, http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=62&sectiontree=2,62
(last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
335.
The caucus charges the ESA with “the dramatic destruction of property rights and
the failure to recover species . . . . If environmentalists and politicians really cared about the
animals, they would get rid of the Act and give landowners the freedom to do what they do
best—produce necessary resources while taking care of the land and all who inhabit it. ESA
has been a failure . . . .” Issues, CONG. W. CAUCUS, http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/
issues1 (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
336.
Shields Testimony, supra note 322, at 2.
337.
Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 6060
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, Water and Power Subcommittee, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of Bennett W. Raley, attorney representing the Northern Colorado Water
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On the other hand, four of the five House Democrats sponsoring the bill
have strong lifetime voting scores from the League of Conservation Voters
(LCV);338 Colorado Senator Mark Udall has a nearly perfect lifetime LCV
score,339 and he was lead sponsor of the Platte RIP authorizing legislation
while serving in the House.340 Thus, although some political support for
RIPs comes from people who oppose the ESA for its “environmental
radicalism,”341 the established programs have also drawn support from those
with strong conservation credentials.
In short, both legally and politically, these programs represent a real
departure from the usual ESA approach. While their ultimate goal is recovery,
they also provide a different means of avoiding jeopardy to listed species
than the usual section 7 consultation process. The next section analyzes
some of these differences in considering the popularity of the RIPs and
their prospects for future success.

IV. ANALYSIS: QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POPULARITY AND FUTURE
OF RIPS FOR WESTERN WATERS
Recovery Implementation Programs have become an accepted means of
ESA compliance and an established part of the water management regime
in the western United States. While the RIPs have done well in legal and
political terms, this success raises questions about the reasons for their
popularity, the chances that they can actually recover listed species, and the
prospects that they will become even more important over time.

Conservancy District) (declaring support for the bill from the Front Range Water Council, a
coalition of entities supplying water to several major cities in Colorado).
338.
Democratic Reps. Coffman, DeGette, and Polis (Colorado), Lujan (New Mexico)
and Matheson (Utah) are all listed as sponsors of H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012). The
League of Conservation Voters keeps an annual scorecard of key environmental votes in
Congress, and gives individual members a percentage rating, with the highest percentages
being the most pro-environment. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARD ’10 at 1 (2011). Through 2010, three of H.R. 6060’s
Democratic cosponsors had lifetime LCV scores of at least 96% (DeGette, Lujan, Polis),
Perlmutter was at 86%, and Matheson was at 64%. Id. at 22, 29, 35.
339.
Id. at 10 (97% through 2010).
340.
See H.R. REP. No. 110-393, at 5 (2007).
341.
See Laura Petersen, Endangered Species: House GOP Touts Fish Recovery Programs
But Still Demands ESA Reforms, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, July 11, 2012 (quoting House Water
and Power Subcommittee Chairman Tom McClintock, who also stated, “This and future
Congresses still have a lot of work to do in reforming the Endangered Species Act, but in
the meantime, [H.R. 6060] offers some common-sense solutions”).
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A. Why Have RIPs Caught On in the Western Water Context?
Several factors may explain why RIPs have become a preferred means
of ESA compliance in western river systems with major USBR water
projects. These factors largely reflect familiar concerns and priorities of
water users and managers in the West.
First, the established RIPs have proved reliable in ensuring section 7
compliance for federal actions relating to water management, development,
and use. They have not only produced a steady stream of findings that
jeopardy will be avoided, but have done so without serious interference with
established or planned water use activities, and without litigation. In other
words, they have effectively kept project operations and water uses on the
Upper Colorado, San Juan, and Platte from a wrenching and contentious,
Klamath-style disruption.
Second, these programs have increased the importance of states in
carrying out the ESA. In contrast to the very limited role for states in the
typical consultation process,342 the RIPs give them significant authority in
determining the measures needed for section 7 compliance, and in overseeing
implementation of these measures. The western states have sought greater
influence in ESA decisionmaking; the Western Governors’ Association
(WGA) has stated, “The Endangered Species Act can effectively be
implemented only through a full partnership between the states, federal
government, local governments, and private landowners.”343 The RIPs
provide that kind of partnership (for the states at least), and an enhanced
role is particularly vital to them in the water resource context, where the
western states have zealously guarded their authority over allocation and
management.
Third, RIPs can provide a corresponding benefit to the USBR and
project water users by involving more entities in activities to benefit listed
species and their habitats. The standard section 7 approach focuses on a
particular federal action, such as operation of a reclamation project, and
requires avoidance of jeopardy that might be caused by that one action—
even where the species is in trouble due to a variety of other actions, such as
non-project water use. Those parties associated with a project going
through consultation may feel they are carrying an unfair burden to save the
species, as reflected in Interior’s failed attempt to limit its responsibility for
Klamath River ESA flows to its proportionate share of Klamath Basin water

342.
See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
343.
WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N POLICY RES. 10-12, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3
(2010). This policy statement calls for ESA reauthorization consistent with four basic principles, one of which is to “[e]nhance the role of state governments in recovering species.” Id.
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use.344 This explains the Interior Secretary’s statement, in support of the
Platte River RIP, that involving all major water users “allows for a more
equitable distribution of effort than what might occur under separate
project consultations. Separate project consultations do not focus on issues
of equity and fair share, but rather focus only on offsetting the effects of the
project currently in consultation.”345
Fourth, the established RIPs have enjoyed relatively secure funding
under their federal authorizing legislation—particularly the two RIPs that
have received a dedicated share of federal hydropower revenues in the
Colorado River Basin.346 They also provide an opportunity for non-federal
entities to bear part of the expense of program implementation, although
the vast majority of the money is still federal.347 Whatever their source,
funds need to be reliably available, particularly in those programs that must
regularly show “sufficient progress” in implementation.348 For the San Juan
RIP, “[f]unding reliability is critical to the success of the Program to ensure
that the Program is conducted on a continuous basis and that high priority
recovery elements are funded every year.”349
Fifth, in addition to reliable funding, RIPs may provide certain benefits
for species that might be difficult or impossible to achieve under a typical
section 7 consultation. The Interior Secretary emphasized this point in
approving the Platte RIP, explaining that water released from upstream
federal projects may need to travel hundreds of miles to reach the key habitat
in the Central Platte. This water “often crosses state lines and always passes
many diversion points. Without the cooperation and assistance of the states
and other water users, much of the water being moved to the Central Platte
Habitat Area could be diverted or stored by other projects.”350 Similarly,
protecting endangered fish from predation or competition by non-native
344.
Because the federal Klamath Project represented 57% of Klamath Basin irrigation,
the 2002 BO for project operations required the project to provide only 57% of the necessary
flows for most of the period it covered. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
345.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 6.
346.
These revenues do not depend on annual appropriations. As noted above, Congress
recently renewed the hydropower funding for the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs. See
supra notes 327–337 and accompanying text.
347.
See infra notes 367–370 and accompanying text. Non-federal funds could come
from water users or water project sponsors as well as states. The Upper Colorado RIP has
always provided for non-federal water project proponents to pay a small fee to FWS based
on the amount of water the new project would deplete—originally $10 per acre-foot—with
the proceeds split evenly between acquisition of water for instream flows, and other recovery
activities. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 5-4. It appears, however,
that such “depletion charges” were never expected to be a major source of funding for the
program. Id. at 5-3.
348.
See generally supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
349.
San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 42.
350.
Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 5-6.
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fish—a key feature of both the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs351—may
be very difficult to achieve without the cooperation of state fish and wildlife
authorities. Thus, while the RIPs have obvious benefits for states, water
users, and the USBR, they also offer some advantages for listed species.
One might say that these programs have become popular for many of
the same reasons that settlements have become the preferred means of
resolving tribal Winters claims—that is, many of the perceived advantages of
RIPs over typical section 7 consultations are similar to the perceived advantages of settlements over litigation of tribal reserved rights.352 For the
western states, benefits include a prominent “seat at the table” where decisions are made, and the resulting power to protect their water users from
disruption or uncertainty that might otherwise result from implementation
of federal law. Just as settlements often give tribes some tangible benefits,
including funding, that would be difficult to obtain through adjudication of
water rights alone, the RIPs may offer similar gains for listed species that
consultation ordinarily would not. And both RIPs and Winters settlements
allow all parties, including the United States, to avoid the cost and uncertainty of litigation, and at least some of the acrimony that can result from a
hard-fought legal and political battle over water. Of course, advocates for
tribes and listed species might find similar, legitimate reasons to criticize
the negotiated approaches for diluting the benefits that should have flowed
from Winters353 and the ESA,354 respectively. But in the context of western
351.
See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
352.
For a brief summary of tribal water right settlements, see supra notes 44–48 and
accompanying text.
353.
In an article focusing on Winters claims to restore streamflows for the benefit of
tribal fisheries, Michael Blumm and his co-authors stated, “[a]lthough tribal reserved water
rights claims may open the door to discussions about streamflow restoration, in practice the
McCarran Amendment Era has reduced these claims to mere bargaining chips rather than
vehicles for achieving the purpose of reservations through streamflow restoration.” Michael
C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration
in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1161 (2006); see
also Thomas P. Schlosser, Dewatering Trust Responsibility: The New Klamath River Hydroelectric
and Settlement Agreements, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 42 (2011) (criticizing, from the
standpoint of tribal resource protection, the negotiated agreements in the Klamath Basin,
discussed supra notes 190–198 and accompanying text).
354.
In an article analyzing the application of the ESA to restore native fish in the
Columbia and Upper Colorado Rivers, Mary Wood concluded that “the Services in both
basins may be straying far from the ESA’s mandate of conserving ecosystems upon which
imperiled species depend. . . . Applying section 7 in this way, the ESA becomes, in effect,
statutory permission for perpetuating a status quo harmful to species.” Mary Christina
Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to Endangered River
Ecosystems, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 251–52 (1998). “The implementation of the ESA in both
basins has suffered from an unwillingness to force changes to the Developed River, despite
section 7’s strong mandate calling upon federal agencies to ‘insure’ that their actions are not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of species.” Id. at 284.
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water resources, where certainty and state authority are fiercely held and
widely recognized values, it is not surprising that federal law evolved to
accommodate them.

B. Can the RIPs Actually Succeed in Recovering Listed Species?
Much of this Article focuses on the RIPs as an alternative to the usual
approach to ESA consultation, and as discussed above, these programs have
been regarded as successful largely because they have provided consistent
and predictable section 7 compliance.355 Their very name, however, indicates
another way that these programs differ from standard consultations: their
goal is to recover threatened and endangered species, not just to avoid
jeopardy caused by federal actions. In the context of dramatically altered
and heavily utilized western river systems, however, this goal of recovery is
exceedingly ambitious.
While promoting recovery certainly sounds better for listed species than
simply avoiding jeopardy, it is fair to question whether even that more
modest goal might be better served by the usual section 7 approach: consultation on a federal action, a BO with an RPA that focuses specifically on
that action (assuming the BO finds jeopardy), and possibly judicial review
of the BO. Some might point to the cases upholding ESA obligations for
fish in the Klamath356 and Middle Rio Grande357 and argue that so long as
the courts continue to insist that saving endangered species remains “the
highest of priorities,”358 the standard consultation process—with rigorous
judicial oversight—remains the best hope for ensuring that listed species
and their habitat get the water they need.359
A broader view of the record, however, shows that ESA section 7 has
had very mixed results, legally speaking, in protecting species from harm
caused by existing federal water projects. Three cautionary points emerge
from the earlier discussion of the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle
355.
The success of these programs in ensuring compliance with the ESA, however,
should not be mistaken for success in achieving recovery of listed species. The Upper Colorado
RIP has been criticized for focusing too much on the former: “If consensus-based management were not a virtually automatic route to [RPA] status, measures of success would rely
less on bureaucratic process and more on progress toward species recovery.” Ann Brower,
Chanel Reedy & Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Consensus versus Conservation in the Upper Colorado
River Basin Recovery Implementation Program, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1001, 1005 (2001)
(“[A]ctual population growth, rather than bureaucratic accomplishments, should serve as the
appropriate gauge.”).
356.
See supra notes 152–158 and accompanying text.
357.
See supra notes 169–176 and accompanying text.
358.
See supra notes 1–3, 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court
decision in TVA v. Hill and its famous “highest of priorities” quote).
359.
See Wood, supra note 354, at 252–85 (arguing for stronger judicial oversight of
ESA decisions regarding river operations to promote recovery of listed species).
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Rio Grande consultations.360 First, in all three basins, the relevant Service
issued a BO that arguably protected the federal project’s established operations far better than it protected the listed species.361 Second, the Services
did have some success in the courts, winning preliminary rounds in both
the Middle Rio Grande362 and the Klamath,363 and of course prevailing on
the Lower Colorado when the Ninth Circuit held that the FWS had broad
discretion in choosing an RPA.364 Third, the legal victories for listed species
were not the end of the story, either in the Klamath—where the Ninth
Circuit decision invalidating the BO was followed by lengthy multilateral
negotiations on a broader agreement for the basin365—or in the Middle Rio
Grande, where Congress quickly passed an appropriations rider partially
overturning the court cases and blocking judicial review of the new BO.366
In short, it is difficult to say whether the standard section 7 approach would
be superior to a RIP in preventing jeopardy, because it is so hard to predict
how the usual consultation-and-litigation sequence would play out in a
particular basin.367
Federal project operations may be slow to change even where the courts
insist on stronger measures to save listed species, as shown by the neverending battle over the ESA and the Federal Columbia River Power System.
Plaintiffs committed to saving Pacific Northwest salmon have had great
360.
See supra Part II.B.
361.
See supra notes 133–134, 144–145, and 170–171, and accompanying text. The 2002
Middle Rio Grande BO was the most extreme in this regard, finding jeopardy, providing no
RPA, but still allowing project operations to continue.
362.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D.N.M. 2002)
(upholding 2001 BO even though the government was wrong regarding its discretion to
provide project water for listed species).
363.
See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426
F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that litigation began with a request by plaintiffs for
a temporary restraining order, denied by the district court); id. at 1090 (explaining that
district court had overturned one aspect of the 2002 Klamath BO but upheld the rest, and
leaving the BO and RPA in place while it was revised) (9th Cir. 2005).
364.
Sw. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515,
523 (9th Cir. 1998).
365.
See supra notes 188–194 and accompanying text.
366.
See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit vacated its
controversial 2003 decision as moot early the following year. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v.
Keys, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). Years later the Tenth Circuit vacated all the decisions
in the litigation, based on mootness. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010).
367.
John Echeverria acknowledged this point in an article that was otherwise quite
critical of the collaborative approach to ESA compliance on the Platte. “It is simply impossible
to know what might have transpired if [Interior] had pursued one of several other political
strategies.” Echeverria, supra note 226, at 561. He also noted that the Platte collaborative
program apparently helped turn back efforts in the 1990s to weaken the ESA, and that
“[p]erhaps nothing more is needed to declare the Platte program a success in these terms.”
Id. at 592.
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success in challenging a string of BOs on the operation of federal hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers.368 Moreover, a recently
retired U.S. district judge has worked doggedly to hold the federal agencies
accountable, taking extraordinary measures in prodding them to produce a
BO that can pass legal muster.369 As chronicled by Michael Blumm, however,
the federal agencies have continually resisted making major changes in the
hydropower system to benefit the salmon,370 seeking instead to avoid
jeopardy through measures such as projected habitat improvements in
Columbia and Snake River tributaries.371 Today, federal operations on the
Columbia remain out of compliance with the ESA,372 nearly two decades
after a federal judge declared that the approach to salmon protection was
seriously flawed “because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that
has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation—that
is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and adjustments—when the
situation literally cries out for a major overhaul.”373
The point is that federal water projects—especially big ones providing
major economic benefits—present a formidable challenge for ESA implementation. I am not suggesting that the challenge is too great for the usual
section 7 approach, or that the standard consultation-and-litigation model
has not resulted in real benefits for listed species in this context. But certain
368.
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA: District
Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming
2013) (describing this litigation from the mid-1990s to the present, including the remand of
multiple BOs on Columbia—Snake operations).
369.
Id. (manuscript at 30–64) (analyzing the role of District Judge Redden in pursuing
adequate remedies under the ESA).
370.
Blumm has described the federal agencies as “practiced at the art of deception” in
implementing the ESA on the Columbia. Michael C. Blumm & Erica Thorson, Practiced at
the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery under the Endangered
Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006); Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing
Judicial Restraints on the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia Basin
Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47 (2008).
371.
One fairly recent development is the Columbia Basin Fish Accords of 2008,
involving the Bonneville Power Administration, the Corps of Engineers, the USBR, four
Columbia Basin tribes and two states. According to Bonneville, these agreements “will result
in numerous new projects and dedicated funding for certain on-going projects (such as
watershed restoration programs) throughout the Columbia River Basin for the next 10 years.
The agreements also mark a turning point for the parties, ushering in a collaborative partnership rather than continuing with an adversarial relationship.” BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., ADMINISTRATOR’S RECORD OF DECISION, 2008 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH ACCORDS
1 (May 2, 2008), available at energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/
EIS-0312-ROD-01-2008.pdf.
372.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or.
2011) (finding the 2008/2010 BO for the Federal Columbia River Power System arbitrary
and capricious).
373.
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 866,
900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
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tough realities seem undeniable: the construction and operation of federal
water projects has dramatically altered western river ecosystems, often to
the grave detriment of native species; large numbers of people and dollars
now depend on continuing established operations of these projects; and
major operational changes will meet powerful and determined resistance,
even if scientists and federal judges insist that such changes are needed for
the survival of listed species.
If avoiding jeopardy is so daunting in this context, can recovery even be
realistic? The answer will of course depend on the specific factors affecting
a particular species, and the feasibility of addressing those factors without
major changes in water management. It is possible that some species can be
restored through measures such as stocking, small-scale habitat restoration,
and fish passage improvements. But Dale Goble’s analysis of successful
recovery efforts374 shows that for most of the delisted species, “their decline
was primarily a result of a specific, eliminable threat . . . and—the factor
that may have trumped the rest—the species are habitat generalists that can
flourish in human-impacted environments.”375 Many of the West’s native
fishes, facing multiple threats and requiring more natural river conditions
than those prevailing today,376 do not fit this pattern. And any species
whose basic habitat needs conflict with established water project operations
is likely to face a long and uncertain road to recovery.377
To their credit, the RIP program documents do not undersell the
magnitude of the task, either in the range of measures needed to benefit the
species378 or in the time that may be required to achieve recovery.379 The
Upper Colorado RIP stated at the outset that recovery “will involve a
massive, long-term program of 15 years and will succeed only with the close
cooperation of all affected parties.”380 That was in 1987, yet today the four
374.
See Dale D. Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk
About Recovery, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 22 (2009) (identifying common elements of
species that were recovered to the point where they could be delisted under the ESA).
375.
Dale D. Goble, A Fish Tale: A Small Fish, the ESA, and Our Shared Future, 40
ENVTL. L. 339, 354 (2010). Goble identified an additional factor: the adequacy of preexisting regulatory mechanisms to protect the species after delisting. Id.
376.
See, e.g., San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 9 (listing several
human-caused impacts on San Juan River native fishes); Upper Colorado RIP Program
Document, supra note 12, at 6-1 to 6-4 (listing factors for decline of four native Upper
Colorado fish species).
377.
See generally Marian Lyman Kirst, Pallids in Purgatory, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Sept. 17, 2012, at 10 (describing obstacles to recovering the endangered pallid sturgeon in the
heavily developed and altered Missouri River system).
378.
See supra notes 275–289 and accompanying text.
379.
The Platte RIP suggests that restoring Central Platte habitat will be a forty-year
effort, with the program currently seeking to do the first third of the job in its initial
thirteen years. See supra notes 287–289 and accompanying text.
380.
Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1.
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Upper Colorado native fish species remain on the endangered species list,381
where two of them have resided since 1967.382 The inability to achieve
recovery may be viewed as a failure of the RIP, but that seems a harsh
assessment given the challenges of restoring aquatic species while allowing
uninterrupted water use and development.383 So long as the West remains
unwilling to “jeopardize” hydropower production or consumptive water uses
for the sake of restoring fish habitat, recovery of many native species will
remain a nearly impossible task.

C. Are RIPs the Way of the Future?
Whatever the challenges RIPs may face in recovering species, their
demonstrated success in legal and political terms384 suggests that we may
see a push to establish them in other basins where the ESA has implications
for water project operations. But while the RIPs have clear advantages
(especially for states and water users) that may make them a popular
choice,385 the larger legal and political context raises questions about their
future. These questions apply even to the existing programs, all of which
allow any signatory to withdraw.386
A major reason why RIPs have gained support, at least among water
users,387 is fear of the alternative: the dreaded “next Klamath,” where application of the ESA to water project operations could significantly reduce
water supplies for existing users, causing economic losses and political
controversy. This threat may become less worrisome, however, either
through rule or statutory changes if the White House or Capitol Hill seeks
to weaken the ESA, or through case law if the courts decide that the USBR
has limited discretion to change project operations for the benefit of listed
381.
See Species Reports, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.ecos.fws.gov/
tess_public/pub/listedAnimals.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (listing the bonytail chub,
Colorado pikeminnow, humpback chub, and razorback sucker as endangered).
382.
See Endangered Species Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/species/faq-first-species-listed.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (explaining the
original endangered species list under a 1966 forerunner to today’s ESA; species listed
include the Colorado squawfish (now pikeminnow) and humpback chub).
383.
“Given the obvious conflicts between those who want to develop the water and
those who want to retain instream flows, it would have been surprising if consensus-based
management in the Colorado River had been effective at recovering the fishes while developing
water use.” Brower et al., supra note 355, at 1006.
384.
See supra Part III.B.
385.
See supra notes 342–354 and accompanying text.
386.
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN, supra note 216, at 2 (1988);
PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra
note 15, at 3; SAN JUAN RIP PROGRAM DOCUMENT, supra note 13, at 48.
387.
See supra note 337 and accompanying text (Bennett Raley remarks).
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species.388 And if the ESA becomes less fearsome to western states and
water users, they are likely to ask themselves why they should participate in
a time-consuming and seemingly endless ESA collaborative program.389
Federal spending cuts represent another potential problem for RIPs.
With the exception of the Platte, where half of program costs are borne by
the states, the RIPs are overwhelmingly paid for with federal dollars. But
the current Congress has pushed to cut discretionary spending, and agency
budgets may shrink significantly in the coming years.390 If the RIPs lack
reliable federal funding, they may find it hard to maintain “sufficient
progress” toward recovery,391 putting the programs at risk of failing to
provide section 7 compliance. In addition, slippage in implementation could
mean that environmental groups abandon the RIPs, potentially shifting
them from participants to plaintiffs.392 Perhaps the programs could survive
budget cuts, perhaps the states and/or water users could increase their
contributions, perhaps the RIPs could keep all their key players at the
table . . . but if federal funding for the RIPs should dry up, their future is in
doubt.
The RIPs may have gained support because they involve federal, state,
and local entities cooperating to protected endangered species,393 but in
today’s political climate they could draw opposition on that basis. If hardcore
conservatives portray the ESA as a broken law needing reform, the federal
government as a heavy-handed oppressor, and political compromise as a
betrayal of principle, some western politicians may hesitate to embrace even
388.
See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2012 WL 3264499 at *6–
9 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the USBR’s annual operation of Glen Canyon Dam nondiscretionary for section 7 purposes); Benson, supra note 96, at 40–51 (analyzing the USBR’s discretion
for section 7 purposes, and arguing that project operations should normally be considered
discretionary).
389.
One Wyoming state official said in 2004 that he did not like the Platte River
collaborative process, but that Wyoming would stay in it so as to prevent “another Klamath.”
Andrew Beck Grace, Truce Holds on the Platte River, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2004),
http://www.hcn.org/issues/280/14930.
390.
See Amena H. Saiyid, Alan Kovski, and Jonathan Nicholson, Environmental
Programs Would Take Hit Under Reductions Outlined in Budget Act, 43 ENV’T REP. 2422 (2012)
(explaining a White House report detailing budget cuts—including a $196 million cut to the
FWS budget—under automatic reductions agreed to by Congress and the White House in
2011).
391.
See supra notes 306–311 and accompanying text.
392.
These problems may be especially acute for the Middle Rio Grande RIP, as this
new program has neither authorizing legislation nor environmental participation as of this
writing.
393.
As then-Congressman John Salazar of Colorado said of the Upper Colorado and
San Juan RIPs in 2006, “This program can serve as a national model for public and private
partnerships for endangered species recovery. It allows water development in accordance to
[sic] the State and Federal laws to continue while the partners work to recover the endangered
fish species.” 152 CONG. REC. H653 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Salazar).
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these “successful” programs. Such reluctance could doom new efforts to
resolve ESA issues collaboratively, such as the negotiated agreement in the
Klamath Basin which is now in limbo due to opposition from the Tea Party,394
and may even cause some participants to leave the existing RIPs.395 Indeed,
when then-Governor Freudenthal “reluctantly” signed Wyoming onto the
Platte River RIP in 2006, he wrote that he took comfort in knowing that,
“if at any time the Program progresses in a direction counter to the best
interests of Wyoming, I can push away from the table and take a different
course.”396
The RIPs have become an established means of ESA compliance in the
context of western river basins—one which western states and water users
have come to support. But even this collaborative model requires agreement
on certain principles: conserving endangered species is a legitimate mandate
of federal law; government has a major role to play in meeting that
mandate; restoring species is a goal worthy of substantial investment of
public funds; and recovering species while protecting water users will
require sustained engagement, patience, and compromise from all parties.
Continued acceptance of these principles among states and elected officials
may lead to new RIPs for river-dependent species in the West. But if these
principles are increasingly challenged, support for the programs may begin
to erode, causing even longtime participants to question their commitment.
It is not difficult to imagine the collapse of one or more existing programs,
particularly if federal funding is interrupted or reduced.
Despite these significant threats, RIPs seem likely to survive—and
perhaps even expand their range—in the western river systems to which
they are endemic. The longevity of the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs
indicates that, once established, these programs have staying power. And
there is reason to believe that new programs will continue to be established:
the last decade has not only seen the consummation of the Platte RIP and
the birth of a brand-new program for the Middle Rio Grande, but also the
creation of the Edwards Aquifer RIP397 and the Missouri River Recovery

394.
See supra notes 188–196 and accompanying text. A local Tea Party group organized
in opposition to the KBRA and managed to defeat the local elected officials who supported
the deal. One of the new officials, elected with Tea Party backing, says that the KBRA is “not
going to go anywhere at all” and is “dying on the vine.” William Yardley, Tea Party Blocks Pact
to Restore a West Coast River, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A16.
395.
Indeed, Klamath County, Oregon voted in 2013 to withdraw from the KBRA.
Klamath County Officials Vote to Drop Out of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement,
OREGONLIVE.COM, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/
02/klamath_county_officials_vote.html.
396.
Press Release, Governor Dave Freudenthal, Governor Signs On to Platte River
Agreement (Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ridenbaugh.com/nwrd/sub/0701%20nwrd.pdf.
397.
See supra notes 20–22 and 208 and accompanying text.
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Implementation Committee.398 In addition, other river basins have seen
their ESA-water conflicts give way to multi-party negotiations, which have
produced broad agreements for the Klamath Basin399 and the RIP-like
MSCP for the Lower Colorado.400 So long as the ESA remains a major
concern for western water managers and users, they will seek practical
options that provide compliance while minimizing uncertainty and avoiding
litigation, and the RIPs have shown that they can do the job.

CONCLUSION
Recovery Implementation Programs have become an established,
alternative approach to ESA compliance in the context of western river
systems with major federal water projects. If the RIPs are judged solely on
their ability to achieve recovery of listed species, the jury is still out—and
may stay out for decades longer. In many respects, however, these programs
may be deemed a success. Western states and water users, especially, have
gained meaningful seats at the table, giving them an ability to control their
destiny and gain a level of certainty that is unique in the section 7 context.
These programs also represent a credible effort to address Congress’
directive for federal agencies to cooperate with state and local entities on
water resource issues, consistent with conservation of listed species.
Because of the membership and decision rules of their implementation
committees, the RIPs could fairly be seen as emphasizing cooperation over
conservation, and thus failing to make recovery “the highest of priorities.”401
But the ESA does not command federal agencies to choose the best course
of action for listed species, only to avoid jeopardizing their continued
existence—and the courts give the FWS significant discretion in how that is
done. The RIPs have allowed water project operations and other federal
actions to gain predictable section 7 compliance with relatively little
controversy, reliable funding, and no litigation. In the high-stakes game of
western water, these programs have allowed the USBR and project water
users to avoid jeopardy, without the questions.

398.
See supra notes 19 and 209 and accompanying text.
399.
See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
400.
The Lower Colorado MSCP is not a RIP because it does not focus on recovery,
but its origins, participation, conservation measures, and approach to ESA compliance are all
similar to those found in the established RIPs. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text.
401.
See Brower et al., supra note 355, at 1006 (calling the Upper Colorado RIP “a
failing recovery program based on a successful consensus-based bureaucracy”).

